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Article
A Right Is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern
Lawmaking
MARK BARTHOLOMEW
This Article challenges the standard account of the creation of the
right of publicity. In legal literature, the prevailing narrative is of the
right of publicity being intimately linked to the commodification of
celebrity. Ultimately, however, there may be more to the story of the right
of publicity than the decision to protect something of economic value. It
took decades after it had become clear that celebrities could be valuable
commercial spokespersons for lawmakers to agree to make the right
inheritable, separate from the dignitary right of privacy, and potentially
applicable to any economic, secondary use that invoked the celebrity
plaintiff. It was only in the later part of the twentieth century, when
American understandings of celebrity became rationalized and
democratized, that the right of publicity was reconceptualized as a much
more vigorous and far-reaching economic entitlement. By examining the
discourse and political environment surrounding the emergence of this
new right, this Article offers a new narrative for the right of publicity's
creation, suggests some broader insights into the social forces that shape
property rights, and enriches a growing body of legal theory examining the
public's role in producing legal change.
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A Right Is Born:
Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking
MARK BARTHOLOMEW*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is defined as "an individual's right to the
exclusive commercial use of his or her name and likeness."' Legal
scholars offer different criticisms of this right,2 but they generally agree on
' Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. For comments on the
Article and helpful discussions of the ideas involved, I thank Horace Anderson, Jr., Rochelle Dreyfuss,
Jeanne Fromer, Angela Harris, Ken Joyce, Sonia Katyal, Greg Lastowka, Amy Maggs, Greg Mandel,
Isabel Marcus, Jason Mazzone, Jack Schlegel, Rob Steinfeld, Eva Subotnik, Mateo Taussig-Rubbo,
John Tehranian, Diane Zimmerman and participants at workshops at Albany Law School, Fordham
Law School, and the University at Buffalo Law School. Thanks to Randy Clower, Nicole Haimson,
and Lee Sobieski for research assistance.
1 Toffoloni v. LFP Publ'g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11 th Cir. 2009).
2 It would be hard to find a property right more vilified in the legal academy than the right of
publicity. Some describe the right as illogical. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, But He
Shouldn't Be: The Right of Publicity Revisited, 1992 BYU L. REV. 597, 613 (describing the right as
lacking a "compelling rationale"); Marshall Leaffler, The Right of Publicity: A Comparative
Perspective, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2007) (describing the right as being based on "on dubious
and incoherent principles"); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb on the Constitutional
Scale: Weighing Speech Against Publicity Rights, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1503, 1524 (2009) (concluding that
a property right in a public persona is "entirely wrong-headed"); see also Michael J. Albano, Note,
Nothing to Cheer About: A Call for Reform of the Right of Publicity in Audiovisual Characters, 90
GEO. L.J. 253, 253 (2001) (contending that by conferring on actors a right of publicity in the fictional
characters through which they became famous, the courts are "overstep[ping] the bounds of logic");
Drake Bennett, Star Power: Celebrities Have a Legal Right to Prevent the Commercial Use of Their
Images Without Permission, BOS. GLOBE, June 4, 2006, at El (labeling the right of publicity "far-
fetched"). Others complain that the right is out of step with international trends. See, e.g., Ellen S.
Bass, A Right in Search of a Coherent Rationale-Conceptualizing Persona in a Comparative Context:
The United States Right of Publicity and German Personality Rights, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 799, 804
(2008) (explaining how "German personality rights [are] conceptually fundamentally different from
publicity rights in the United States"); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity
Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1184 (2006) ("A broad right of publicity runs
counter to historical assumptions and social norms in the United States and around the world."). Others
complain about the right's potential to chill free expression. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of
Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Law and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1853, 1865-67 (1991) (arguing that the increase in enforcement of intellectual property rights,
including the right of publicity, could potentially inhibit cultural dialogue); Michael Madow, Private
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 134 (1993)
(putting forth the theory that publicity rights limit "free expression and cultural pluralism"); Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOus. L. REV. 903, 925 (2003) (noting that
in its largest sense, using a celebrity's image or likeness in advertising should be protected under the
First Amendment); David S. Welkowitz & Tyler T. Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser: How Arnold
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when and why courts and legislatures decided to recognize it. The
standard account of the right's creation goes like this: The right came into
being in the 1950s once the practice of advertising using celebrities had
grown to such an extent that the commercial value of celebrity became
apparent. Increased access to media and a weakening of familial ties in
the early 1900s paved the way for rapid growth in the popularity of
entertainment and sports figures, with a concomitant premium placed on
their use in advertising. Celebrities now had new economic value; hence,
they needed new legal privileges to protect that value. The prevailing
narrative, therefore, intimately links the right of publicity with the
commodification of celebrity. Once something is viewed as having market
value, the legal system invariably steps in to protect that value.
Ultimately, however, there is more to the story of the right of publicity
than the decision to protect something of economic value. This Article
offers a different account of how the famous earned protections from
lawmakers. Even after the right of publicity was first articulated in the
1950s, something held lawmakers back. Rather than championing full
property rights in celebrity personas, courts and legislatures made sure that
the right was not descendible and that the aspects of a persona that were
Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity to Terminate Non-Defamatory Political Speech, 45 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 651, 671 (2005) (explaining how a celebrity's right to privacy can have a "stultifying
effect on freedom of expression").
3 See George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 LA. L.
REV. 443, 455 (1991) (discussing how opportunities to market personas were practically nonexistent in
the nineteenth century); Madow, supra note 2, at 148 (stating that the "standard answer" for why the
right was not recognized until relatively recently is that "nothing in our experience before the early
1900's... made such a right necessary"); Steven Semeraro, Property's End: Why Competition Policy
Should Limit the Right of Publicity, 43 CONN. L. REV. 753, 784 (2011) ("[W]hen the right of publicity
arose in the 1950s, 'the needs of Broadway and Hollywood' were far different from the use of celebrity
in popular culture in earlier times.").
4 See ELLIS CASHMORE, CELEBRITY/CULTURE 87-88 (2006) (discussing how societal changes
made way for a "universal culture currency" and "celebrity worship"); Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights
of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 789 (2009) ("The inventions of radio and television gave birth
to the right of publicity in 1953 or 1954 and eventually led to the creation of a posthumous right of
publicity as early as the mid-1970s.").
5 See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 3, at 463-64 (arguing that "the market also modifies our
concept[s] of [value and] morality" and influences the molding of legal ideas); Rosemary J. Coombe,
Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10
CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365, 368-69 (1992) (discussing the commercial value of celebrity, as well
as the potential legal justifications and ramifications of granting a property right in a celebrity's
persona); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1172-74 (stating that the courts, in evaluating publicity
claims, increasingly "adopted an attitude of 'if value, then right"'); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who
Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 35, 51 (1998)
("Lawmakers and creative individuals alike increasingly treat as received truth the contestable intuition
that producers of intellectual ... products should have a 'right' to any income stream their labor can
generate.. . . This pro-property mind-set has been further encouraged by the gradual recognition that
income from intellectual property makes up a very significant part of the United States' balance of
payments in the international trade arena.").
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protected remained limited. It took decades after it had become clear that
celebrities could be effective commercial spokespersons for the right of
publicity to change in significant ways, ultimately strengthening the power
of celebrity and creating a powerful economic entitlement.
The right's history shows that not every story of commodification
results in immediate recognition by the legal system. In many situations,
despite the existence of obvious exchange value in a particular item, legal
recognition of that value is withdrawn or is never recognized in the first
place. Where once there was an understood market for appointments to
political offices, such practices are no longer legal.6 Although it is possible
to envision a thriving market for the supply of infants to would-be parents,
attempts to commodify adoption and surrogacy remain highly contested.7
The facts making up information rich databases enjoy virtually no
intellectual property protection in the United States despite their
tremendous commercial value.8 Perhaps even more analogous to rights in
celebrity personas are the recent presentations by various intellectual
property scholars on examples of intangible assets that have definite value
to a particular community yet rely on social norms for their safeguarding
rather than any official legal protection. Fashion designers, chefs, and
magicians all construct intangible assets desired by others, yet these
creators lack the intellectual property protections of other artists and
inventors.9 Hence, mere exchange value, in itself, is not necessarily a
6 See, e.g., Susan Saulny & Malcolm Gay, Illinois House Panel Unanimously Recommends
Impeaching Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009, at Al9 (discussing the recommended impeachment of
Governor Blagojevich due to the questionable legality of the governor's appointment of Roland W.
Burris to the Senate).
7See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1850, 1925-34
(1987) (discussing the advantages and dangers of commodification of babies and surrogacy); see also
Julia D. Mahoney, Altruism, Markets, and Organ Procurement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 20
(2009) (discussing widespread opposition to recognition of body parts as property that can be traded on
the market and the creation of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) in response to "fears that the
demand for transplantable organs could lead to the commodification of the human body").
8 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1702 n. 14
(2009) ("To be precise, U.S. law provides virtually no protection for the factual content of database
products .... "); Kembrew McLeod, The Private Ownership of People, in THE CELEBRITY CULTURE
READER 649, 660 (P. David Marshall ed., 2006) (indicating that large corporations have yet to secure
intellectual property protection over large databases of consumer information).
9 See Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians' Intellectual Property Without Law,
in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123, 135-37 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010)
(discussing norms and methods within the magic community to protect secrets, techniques, and
presentations); Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems:
The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 187-88 (2008) (comparing the attributes of norms-based
and law-based intellectual property systems and relating it to the culinary industry); Kal Raustiala &
Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design,
92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1689-91 (2006) (discussing the lack of intellectual property protection in the
fashion industry); see also David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Emergent Property Norms in
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recipe for property rights.'°
Instead, other social and political changes must occur before the legal
system will create a new property right. In addition to facilitating market
exchange, property laws also structure the social order.'" Property rights
set boundaries in the ways members of society interact, in effect serving as
a blueprint for social relations. 12 As a result, judges and lawmakers must
be made comfortable with the social implications of a legal right in
something before property rights can accrete. Merely recognizing that
something is valuable is not enough. Rather, other social forces-
technological, cultural, and political--disrupt settled expectations and
produce legal change. Part of the goal of this Article is to figure out what
those social forces are by examining the context in which publicity rights
grew at the end of the twentieth century. The approach in this Article
complements a growing body of legal theory that examines the role of the
broader public in producing legal change. 3 What it adds, in addition to
Pseudonymous Performance Subcultures, 90 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6)
(discussing norm among roller derby players of not appropriating other players' nicknames).
1o See Miller v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 299 F.2d 706, 709-10 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting that
while one's time and experience can be sold, they are still not considered legal property); see also
David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
71, 72 (2005) (observing that "[p]ublicity rights initially emerged in response to functionalist
considerations" as "transferable rights were needed to keep pace with commercial custom").
1 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 1-2 (1997) (arguing that viewing property as a market
commodity is only half right and that "property is the material foundation for creating and maintaining
the proper social order, the private basis for the public good"); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 61 (2000) (explaining the regulatory functions and
powers of property law to "enact[] a form of social life"); see also Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and
Liberty, 34 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 79 (2010) ("Private property is a social creation, arising out of
law, and is inevitably justified (given its interferences with liberty) only to the extent that it benefits
people collectively, non-owners as well as owners.").
12 Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1054 (2009).
13 In constitutional law, this approach is typically referred to as "popular constitutionalism." See
Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of
Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 898-99 (2005) (summarizing the major popular
constitutionalist literature). Its proponents explain that social movements play a key role in disrupting
public understandings in a way that allows the public to engage legal institutions and eventually bring
about reformulations of legal principles. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices,
and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 946-50 (2006) (discussing the role of social
movements in unsettling norms and legal ordering); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements,
and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1488-90 (2006) (arguing that
"law's capacity to trigger social movement" has been overstated and that "nonlegal, noninstitutional
forms of political activism" have been undervalued in the legal literature). There has been less
exploration of the influence of such movements on property law, although some scholars have begun to
articulate their own view of the relationship between property law and social change. See, e.g., Nestor
M. Davidson & Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Property in Crisis, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607 (2010); Katherine
V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing
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refuting the conventional wisdom surrounding the birth of an important
legal right, is the use of social history as a counterweight to the law and
economics analysis that characterizes much of intellectual property
scholarship. 14
That history shows that in the later part of the twentieth century,
American understandings of celebrity became democratized and
rationalized, paving the way for increasing legal protections against
secondary use of well-known personas. Once viewed with apprehension as
a destabilizing, emotional phenomenon, celebrity came to be perceived as a
valuable capitalist tool. At the same time, the definition of celebrity
switched from a focus on historic accomplishments and inner talents to an
emphasis on the potential ability of anyone to grab the media spotlight. It
was only after these intellectual trends took hold that lawmakers became
willing to increase the scope of celebrity rights.
1 5
By examining the discourse and political environment surrounding the
emergence of a new right, this Article hopes to offer a new narrative for
the right of publicity's creation as well as broader insights into the social
Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 721-25 (2002); Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War
Paradigm in American Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 139, 140-49 (2008).
14 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1129
(2009) ("For the last several decades... the analysis of copyright law has come to be dominated by the
traditional law and economics account of the institution."); see also Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-
Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 750 (2009) (describing law and
economics analysis as dominating property scholarship in recent years); Jedediah Purdy, People as
Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE
L.J. 1047, 1052 (2007) (noting that much of the current commentary on property regimes has taken a
"normative commitment to wealth-maximization").
15 Admittedly, one must be careful before suggesting that a causal relationship exists between
certain intellectual movements and the law. Academic discussions do not always translate into legal
innovation. See Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews
Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (discussing the argument that law reviews "no longer
[have] any impact on the courts"). Judges and legislative bodies make law for a host of reasons that
may have less to do with theoretical coherence than respect for precedent, political expediency, and the
strategic actions of litigants. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in
American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 936-37 (1996) (noting how manufacturers are often better
able to influence the legislative process than consumers); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court
Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 186-87 (1999) (finding that
elected judges permit higher damages awards, particularly against out-of-state businesses, than
appointed judges). Yet failure to study the pronouncements of courts and legislatures for evidence of
cultural influence results in an overly narrow construction of what we mean by "law." See P. John
Kozyris, Comparative Law for the Twenty-First Century: New Horizons and New Technologies, 69
TUL. L. REV. 165, 168 (1994) ("Laws cannot be grasped in an idealized form outside the context of the
society that created them."); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1325 & n.6 (2006)
(articulating a general theory for how social movements influence legal understandings); see also
Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People,
98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1516-17 (2010) (arguing that Supreme Court decisions are more influenced by
political and academic elites than public opinion). The impetus for lawmaking comes from several
sources, but intellectual trends are surely one of them.
2011] A RIGHT IS BORN
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forces that shape legal change. To that end, Part II describes how the right
of publicity transformed from a non-descendible, narrow personal right in
the 1950s to a descendible, broadly construed property right in the 1980s
and 1990s. Although the right of publicity first appeared in the courts in
1953, it took decades for it to be augmented in a manner resembling other
types of intellectual property. It was only during the last two decades of
the century that this right became inheritable, separate from the dignitary
right of privacy, and applicable to any secondary, economic use that
invoked the celebrity plaintiff.
Parts III-V trace the evolution of celebrity over the second half of the
twentieth century, offering evidence of intellectual and political change
and suggesting how that change is mirrored in the decisions of courts and
state legislatures. Part III reveals that the economic understanding of
celebrity changed at the end of the twentieth century. Long after it was
understood that celebrity had financial value, this understanding shifted to
place a higher premium on that value and to attribute that value to a single
individual. Rather than ratifying any item of value, the legal system took
its time-only protecting celebrity personas after the economic potential of
fame could be fully captured by the stars themselves and had eclipsed the
financial rewards of achievement.
Part IV describes the rationalizing of celebrity. Intellectuals writing in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries distrusted celebrity, perceiving
the crowds that conferred celebrity status on select individuals as irrational
and destructive. In time, however, efforts to quantify popularity convinced
late twentieth century thinkers that fame could be harnessed in a way that
was economically and socially productive. At the same time, new
attention to the aesthetics of celebrity calmed fears over the
psychologically destructive effects of fame. As celebrity was transformed
into something predictable, legislators and judges abandoned their earlier
hesitance to adopt legal rules that would encourage more and more citizens
to seek fame.
Finally, Part V outlines the political economy of modem celebrity,
describing celebrity's reconceptualization as a democratic force. The
seminal changes to the right in the 1980s and 1990s-changes that greatly
expanded the power of celebrities to halt outside uses of their personas-
occurred in a particular political environment. A restrictive notion of fame
was replaced with a different definition no longer linked to merit or inner
greatness. Anyone, it was argued, had the potential to become famous.
Meanwhile, the newfound economic power of celebrities translated into
greater political power for them and their licensing agents. As a result, by
the last part of the twentieth century, backers of the right of publicity could
mobilize and successfully co-opt powerful interest groups that were once
opposed to the right. Although cultural theorists of the time articulated
new theories of the celebrity audience that stressed the importance of
[Vol. 44:301
individual reworking of celebrity texts, individual consumers lacked an
effective voice in the legislative process and failed to halt the expansion of
celebrity rights.
II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The fledgling right of publicity underwent significant changes in the
1980s and 1990s. First, it became accepted doctrine in most jurisdictions
that the right was descendible, ensuring centralized control of commercial
use of celebrity personae decades after the celebrity died. Prior to the
1980s, most courts and legislatures did not provide for celebrity rights after
death. Second, the right shifted away from its genesis in the right of
privacy, becoming a separate legal tool aligned with economic power
rather than dignitary interests. Third, the aspects of persona governed by
the right expanded greatly, placing more power in the hands of celebrities
and their assignees. The rest of this Part describes these changes in more
detail. Parts II-V explain why these changes occurred when they did.
A. The Right of Publicity Before the 1980s
Most explanations of the right of publicity begin with a discussion of
privacy rights. 16  Before 1953, celebrity litigants wishing to block
unauthorized use of their name or likeness charged violations of the "right
of privacy." Born from an 1890 law review article authored by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis, as originally articulated, the right of privacy
protected citizens from the disclosure of embarrassing private facts. 17 The
right of privacy, also expressed as the right of an individual "to be let
alone," was viewed as a necessary counterweight to commercial and
technological innovations that increasingly pried into one's private life.18
Sometimes the right was used to stop commercial appropriations of one's
persona. For example, in one early case, the Georgia Supreme Court used
the Warren and Brandeis theory to block unauthorized use of a person's
photograph in a newspaper advertisement for life insurance.' 9 The court
sympathized with the plaintiff, describing "the humiliation and
mortification of having his picture displayed in places where he would
16 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law
Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1557 (2010); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1167-
71; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 191, 192-95 (1983); Gloria Franke, Note, The Right of Publicity vs. the First
Amendment: Will One Test Ever Capture the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 948-52 (2006).
17 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 215-16
(1890) (explaining, in part, that "[t]he general object in view is to protect the privacy of private life").
18 Id. at 205; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1168 (stating that a privacy right "would
redress the harms that private individuals suffered from invasions of their privacy").
19 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905).
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never go to be gazed upon, at times when and under circumstances where
if he were personally present the sensibilities of his nature would be
severely shocked.,
20
For most celebrity plaintiffs, however, their efforts to halt commercial
use of their name or likeness fit awkwardly into the standard account of the
right of privacy. As articulated by Warren and Brandeis, the privacy right
was designed to protect dignitary interests, not economic ones. As a result,
remedies in privacy cases necessitated a showing of emotional distress.2'
But celebrities, rather than being emotionally harmed by having their
image thrust before the public, actually labored for just that result, as
evidenced by their public performances. Hence, courts in the first half of
the twentieth century denied relief to celebrities suing for unauthorized use
of their name or likeness because, it was reasoned, every celebrity needed
and wanted the public to be aware of their persona.22
By most accounts, what is thought of today as the right of publicity
came into being in 1953 in the case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps
Chewing Gum.23 The parties in that matter both published baseball cards,
but only the plaintiff had obtained exclusive contracts granting permission
from the featured players to have their pictures on the cards.24 As with
other celebrity cases of the time, the right of privacy seemed mismatched
to the plaintiffs claims. Because the baseball players had already sought
the public eye and had already consented to having their pictures sold
along with chewing gum (albeit not the defendants' chewing gum), it was
hard to justify relief under a theory of dignitary harm.
Rather than trying to shoehorn the plaintiffs' claim into the right of
privacy, the Second Circuit in Haelan called into being a new right. This
new right, "the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing [one's]
picture," was anchored in commercial possibility, not in the right to be let
alone.25 As the decision's author, Judge Jerome Frank, explained, "it is
2 Id. at 80.
21 See, e.g., Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952). In the Pavesich
case, the court maintained that the newspaper advertisement at issue would make Pavesich
"contemptible" among his friends once they found that he actually did not own that particular insurance
policy. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 81.
22 E.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (reasoning that for a
professional football player whose photograph was used in a beer commercial without his permission,
"the publicity he got was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving"); Pallas v.
Crowley-Milner & Co., 54 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Mich. 1952) (holding that plaintiff had waived her
privacy right against advertiser because she had become known as a performer and model); see also 1
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:25 (2d ed. 2009) ("Locked into
the rubric of a 'right to be let alone and private,' privacy law seemed unable to accommodate the claims
of those whose identity was already public.").
23 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 1:26 (noting Haelan as
the first case to use the term "right of publicity").24Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867.
25Id. at 868.
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common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and
ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public
exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer
received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, buses, trains, and
subways. 26  Although linked to the right of privacy (as articulated by
Judge Frank), this new right was rooted, not in dignitary concerns, but
rather in a belief that famous persons should control the economic rewards
of their celebrity.
27
Haelan represented a great expansion in the law. Now even those who
sought the public eye instead of seclusion could use the courts to block
unauthorized uses of their images. Yet this expansion was cabined in
several ways. First, the early right of publicity died with the celebrity at
issue.28 The most influential jurisdiction for celebrity rights, California,
concluded that the right was not descendible. 29  The second most
influential jurisdiction, New York, concluded the same after some initial
moves in the opposite direction.3 ° In general, the California and New York
decisions squared with the rest of the states.3' In a 1980 decision, the Sixth
26 Id.
27 See Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw.
U. L. REv. 553, 555 (1961) (describing early publicity cases as involving "the right to be free from
commercial exploitation, rather than the 'right to be let alone"'); Joseph R. Grodin, Note, The Right of
Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123, 1127 (1953) ("[T]he Haelan case gave
protection to persons' commercial interest in their personality independent of their privacy interest.").
28 David S. Wall, Policing Elvis: Legal Action and the Shaping of Postmortem Celebrity Culture
as Contested Space, 2 ENT. L. 35, 58 (2003) (stating that before the early 1980s, "the consensus of
opinion was that the rights to publicity could be exercised throughout the lifetime of the artist, but that
they were not descendible upon death").
29 Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979) (holding that "the right
of publicity protects against the unauthorized use of one's name, likeness or personality, but that the
right is not descendible and expires upon the death of the person so protected"); see also Groucho Marx
Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1982) (construing California law and
concluding that under the law of the State, "an individual's right of publicity terminates at his death").
30 Initially, federal courts asked to construe New York common law hypothesized that New York
would recognize postmortem publicity rights. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating that the court had found the right of publicity to be a "valid property
right which is transferable and capable of surviving the death of the owner"); Price v. Hal Roach
Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("There appears to be no logical reason to
terminate [the right of publicity] upon death of the person protected."). The New York state courts
rejected this approach, ruling that no right of publicity protection exists in New York outside of the
state privacy statute and the statute does not provide for postmortem publicity rights. See Stephano v.
News Grp. Pubs., Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (holding there was no common law right of
publicity); Smith v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 499 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168 (App. Div. 1986)
(finding that the invasion of an infant's privacy "belonged to the infant alone and was extinguished
upon the infant's death"); Antonetty v. Cuomo, 502 N.Y.S.2d 902, 906 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (refusing to
recognize publicity and defamation claims for a deceased celebrity).
31 See Armstrong, supra note 3, at 443 ("Until the 1970s any commercial value associated with
celebrity was personal to the star and entered the public domain at death."); Smolensky, supra note 4,
at 790 ("Like other privacy rights, the right of publicity traditionally died with the decedent, and estates
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Circuit offered a particularly vigorous critique of a descendible publicity
right. 32 The court articulated a variety of arguments against recognizing a
posthumous right under Tennessee common law. It listed multiple
prudential concerns over the length of such a right and its tax consequences
and scoffed at the idea that rights after death would somehow incentivize
creative endeavors.33
The prohibition on posthumous rights represented a significant check
on the right of publicity. Strictly as a matter of timing, it meant that
celebrity could only be monetized during a famous person's lifespan. The
limited timeframe diminished celebrity's value. Publicity rights were
worth less money, as merchandisers and licensees could never be sure
when their exclusive rights would run out, i.e., when the celebrity at issue
would die.34
In addition, the ban on postmortem publicity rights designated such
rights as an inferior sort of property-if they were even considered
property at all. "The right to control the disposition of property at death is
often seen as essential to the very notion of private property. '35  The
Supreme Court has called the right to bequeath one's property at death
"one of the most essential sticks" in the bundle of property rights.36 Yet,
by separating the right of testamentary disposition from publicity rights,
courts made sure that the publicity right had an inferior status.37 If the
celebrity did not have "absolute dominion" over her name and persona,
then publicity rights represented only a quasi-property right that could be
watered down when courts faced controversial questions.38
were not allowed to bring suit to recover for the unauthorized use of the decedent's likeness.");
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 45 (contending that in the earliest publicity cases "courts were slow to
allow the right to be exercised by anyone but the celebrity herself or to permit its survival at death").32 See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (refusing to
protect Elvis Presley's right of publicity after his death).33 Id. at 959-60. Courts at the time also suggested that allowing publicity rights to be asserted on
behalf of the dead presented particular First Amendment concerns. When asked to use the right of
publicity to block Norman Mailer's biography of Marilyn Monroe, the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, of New York put it bluntly: "The protection of the right of free expression is so important that
we should not extend any right of publicity, if such exists, to give rise to a cause of action against the
publication of a literary work about a deceased person." Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427
N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1980).
34 See Westfall & Landau, supra note 10, at 87-88; see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603
P.2d 425, 445-46 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) ("[C]utting [the right of publicity] off at death
would seriously impair its value during life and erode commercial certainty as licensees would be less
willing to pay for a right that could be cut off suddenly at any time.").33 RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD
57 (2010).
36 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
37 See Andrew B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 453,
456 (1981) ("[Mlost property rights in our legal system are both assignable and survivable .....")38 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 6 (2006)
(describing classical legal thought as guided by the conception of a system of individual legal property
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Second, courts construing the early right of publicity often refused to
completely disengage it from its right of privacy origins. 39 Some evidence
of this can be seen in the decisions to limit the right of publicity to the
lifetime of the personality at issue. Courts reasoned that if the publicity
right stemmed from the right of privacy, and rights of privacy were
personal rights that perished with the death of the individual whose privacy
was threatened, then the publicity right should also cease upon death.4 °
Many judges approached the new right with extreme caution and
refused to attach the label "property" to it. Hence, the Second Circuit, just
a few years after deciding Haelan, determined that band-leader Glenn
Miller's publicity rights, when sold by his widow to a movie studio, did
not represent "property. '41 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the right of
publicity, even though it had commercial value, resembled some species of
property legally inferior to personal property, similar to "titles," "offices,"
"trust," and "fi-iendship. '' 42 The court stated, "[flame falls in the same
category as reputation; it is an attribute from which others may benefit but
may not own.' '43  Other courts raised the question of whether the right
should be labeled a "tort right" or a "property right" only to refuse to
decide the issue.44 In other decisions, judges carefully referred to the right
holders exercising an "absolute dominion over property"); Semeraro, supra note 3, at 818 ("True
property rights empower their owners to prohibit speech that uses the owner's property. Free speech
analysis thus begs the ultimate question as to whether the right of publicity is a valid property right. If
not, speech interests trump the celebrity's interests.").
39 See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[T]he rights
of privacy and publicity are intertwined due to the similarity between the nature of the interests
protected by each."); Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 429 (discussing the court's previous contention that the right
of publicity is "essentially that of a claimed invasion of a right of privacy"); James v. Screen Gems,
Inc., 344 P.2d 799, 800-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (denying the right of publicity claim of a celebrity's
widow because the right of privacy cannot be asserted by a third person); see also Howard I. Berkman,
The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOK. L. REV. 527, 540
(1976) ("Courts persist in confusing the right of publicity with the right of privacy and deny relief for
invasion of the right of publicity in cases in which relief for invasion of the right of privacy is barred.").
But see Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("While much
confusion is generated by the notion that the right of publicity emanates from the classic right of
privacy, the two rights are clearly separable.").40 E.g., Reeves v. United Artists Corp., 765 F.2d 79, 80 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the widow of
the professional boxer featured in the film Raging Bull had no right of publicity claim under Ohio law
because the right of publicity is part of Ohio's law of invasion of privacy); see also Westfall & Landau,
supra note 10, at 86 (describing courts who considered publicity rights to be personal rights and
therefore not descendible).
41 Miller v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 299 F.2d 706, 711 (2d Cir. 1962).
42 Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980).
43 Id.
44 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868-69 (2d Cir. 1953)
("Whether [the right of publicity] be labeled a 'property' right is immaterial ... "); Guglielmi v.
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 140 Cal. Rptr. 775, 778 (Ct. App. 1977), rev'd, 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979)
("It is unimportant whether the [right of publicity] is labeled as a tort right or property right."); see also
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAUF. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960) ("It seems quite pointless to dispute
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as a "proprietary" right rather than a property right, attaching a label to the
right of publicity commonly used to describe not real or personal property,
but the lesser form of intellectual property.45 Thus, despite the Haelan
decision, courts in the 1960s and 1970s remained wary of the new right
and refused to treat celebrity personas as full-fledged items of personal
property.
Third, courts limited the early right of publicity by narrowly defining
the personal features subject to legal protection. While using the name or
photographic image of the celebrity fell within the scope of the new right,
intentional imitations of a celebrity's voice did not.46 Thus, when Nancy
Sinatra sued Goodyear Tire for airing radio and television commercials
featuring a singer hired to imitate her own singing style, the Ninth Circuit
rejected her claim, suggesting that Sinatra's voice was not distinctive
enough to deserve protection.47 In a similar case involving actress Shirley
Booth, the court expressed concern with recognizing publicity claims
against mere imitators given the difficulty of enforcing and policing a ban
on inexact copies of someone's persona.48 Statutory rights of publicity of
over whether such a right is to be classified as 'property."') (quoted with approval in Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979)).
45 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) ("[T]he State's interest
in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual ....");
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[W]e conclude that
the California appellate courts would ... afford legal protection to an individual's proprietary interest
in his own identity."); Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 213 U.S.P.Q. 96, 101 (C.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The law affords protection to an individual's proprietary
interest in his own identity."); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bembach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664
(App. Div. 1977) ("There is no question but that a celebrity has a legitimate proprietary interest in his
public personality."); see also Sonia K. Katyal, Filtering, Piracy Surveillance, and Disobedience, 32
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 401, 412 (2009) (describing the "host of inherent limitations on both access and
use" that are not found with real property that "often serve to complicate an intellectual property
right").
4 See Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that an
imitation of a celebrity's voice did not constitute unfair competition under New York law); Sinatra v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 713, 718 (9th Cir. 1970) (affirming a ruling that imitation
of a celebrity's voice did not rise to a cause of action); Davis v. Trans World Airlines, 297 F. Supp.
1145, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1969) ("[limitation alone does not give rise to a cause of action.").
41 Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716. The court also expressed concern that a contrary ruling would violate
federal copyright law. See id. at 717-18 (noting that a "clash with federal law seems inevitable" if the
action were to be granted under state law).
48 Booth, 362 F. Supp. at 347 (listing "persuasive reasons of public policy for refusing to
recognize a performer's right of protection against imitators"). One option in this period for celebrity
plaintiffs hindered by the narrow interpretation of the right of publicity was to turn to federal trademark
law. Arguably, different aspects of a celebrity's persona can act as a trademark and therefore
secondary uses of those aspects can be blocked under federal trademark law when there is a likelihood
of consumer confusion. The Lanham Act prevents confusing uses of not just words but also
"symbols," thereby potentially offering a mechanism for protecting aspects of celebrity identity. See
generally Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2006). Yet there were several limits on use of the
Lanham Act to prevent secondary uses of celebrity. Longstanding doctrine held personal names as
inherently non-distinctive and thus required proof of secondary meaning before a trademark
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the time matched these courts' common law interpretations, typically
limiting their reach to appropriations of a celebrity's name or likeness, and
sometimes her actual voice.49
B. The Right of Publicity in the 1980s and 1990s
At the beginning of the 1980s, the right of publicity stood on uncertain
ground. Although some courts and legislatures hinted towards recognizing
posthumous publicity rights, the law did not appear to be moving in any
clear direction.50 As judges continued to discuss publicity rights and
privacy rights in the same breath,5' courts remained reluctant to recognize
violations of the right that did not expressly involve use of the celebrity's
name or likeness. In a relatively short period of time, this all changed. In
the 1980s and 1990s, most state legislatures that addressed the issue found
the right to be descendible. At the same time, judges finally broke the right
away from its privacy law moorings. Doctrinal innovations showed less
solicitude for the early restrictions on the right's scope and more concern
with ensuring full capture of the economic benefits of celebrity by a single
rights holder.
In 1980, legal opinion was split on whether the right of publicity
should be descendible. Many courts and commentators argued that the
right should die with the celebrity. 2 The Sixth Circuit contended that a
postmortem publicity right was "contrary to our legal tradition and ... to
the moral presuppositions of our culture. 5 3 Nevertheless, in the next few
infringement action could be recognized. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13.2 (4th ed. 1996) ("[Surnames] acquire legally protectable status only
after they have had such an impact upon a substantial part of the buying public as to have acquired
Isecondary meaning."'); see also, e.g., L.E. Waterman Co. v. Modem Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88, 94 (1914)
(stating that the law will protect against competitors intentionally attempting to cash in on an
"established and well known" name). Moreover, for any aspect of a person's identity to acquire
trademark rights, that aspect had to be used as mark. A celebrity who has never commercially
exploited the symbols of her identity would therefore not be eligible for trademark protection. See 5 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, supra, § 28:11. Hence, trademark protection at this stage only protected
extremely well-known public figures that had already acted to commercially exploit their fame.
41 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(1) (West 2006) (limiting right to protection of "name
and likeness"); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (West 2000) (limiting right to "the use of the
individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness" after individual's death); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 45-3-2(6) (LexisNexis 2010) (defining protectable "personal identity" as "an individual's name,
title, picture, or portrait"); see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir, 1988)
(interpreting California's right of publicity statute to apply only to use of the plaintiff's actual voice).
so See Kwall, supra note 16, at 207 (noting that there was "[c]onsiderable disagreement" among
the courts over the descendibility issue during the early 1980s).
5' See Berkman, supra note 39, at 527, 531.
52 See Kwall, supra note 16, at 207-08 (stating that some courts refused to grant recovery for a
decedent's relatives, even when the defendants appropriated the deceased's name and likeness for
commercial purposes).
53 Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980).
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years, several state legislatures and courts adopted postmortem rights. In
1984, Kentucky enacted a law recognizing the right of publicity for fifty
years after death.54 In 1985, the California legislature passed a law
explicitly designed to create a postmortem right of publicity, effectively
overruling at least one state supreme court decision denying the right.55
Oklahoma enacted a law in 1986 creating a postmortem publicity right
with a one-hundred-year duration. 6 In 1987, the Texas legislature passed
a bill to create a postmortem right that remains in effect for fifty years after
the individual's death.57 The Texas and Oklahoma statutes went so far as
to extend their protections to celebrities who had died before the law was
passed.
58
Meanwhile, courts began to decide these matters differently than
before. In State v. Crowell,59 the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued what
might have been the most full-throated judicial defense of the right in the
decade, particularly given the Sixth Circuit's contrary interpretation of
Tennessee common law just a few years earlier. 60  The court firmly
established a common law postmortem right in Tennessee, noting that
allowing use of a celebrity's image after death would result in "unjust
enrichment" for advertisers and that, despite the lack of a national legal
consensus on the issue, celebrities and businesses already had settled
expectations that famous personae were valuable capital assets that lasted
after death.6' The court of appeals may have been somewhat emboldened
by the Tennessee legislature's decision to create a statutory right of
publicity in 1984. Not only did the home state of Elvis Presley create a
postmortem right, but it allowed the statutory right to descend in perpetuity
so long as the celebrity persona continued to be used commercially.
62
In the 1990s, the postmortem march continued as more states passed
laws granting posthumous publicity rights. Legislatures in Illinois,
54 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 6:61.
5 Id. § 6:24.
56 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1448-1449 (2010).
57 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.012(d) (West 2000) ("A person may use a deceased individual's
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in any manner after the 50th anniversary of the date of
the individual's death.").
58 See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1448 (stating that a "deceased personality" shall include any person
who died within fifty years prior to the statute's effective date); I MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 6:120
(stating that the Texas publicity statute applies to any person who died within fifty years prior to the
effective date of the statute).
9 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)
60 See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating that
descendibility is "contrary to our legal tradition and somehow seems contrary to the moral
presuppositions of our culture").
61 Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 98.
62 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1105(a) (West 2010).
[Vol. 44:301
Indiana, Ohio, and Washington passed laws extending postmortem rights. 6 3
In Washington, for a person whose identity has commercial value at the
time of his or her death, the right of publicity lasts an additional seventy-
five years. 64 Indiana's statutory scheme is perhaps the most celebrity-
friendly of any jurisdiction.65  Enacted in 1994, the Indiana right of
publicity statute grants a one-hundred-year postmortem duration that
covers those who died as far back as 1894.66
Meanwhile, courts continued to conclude that state common law
should provide postmortem rights. Even though Utah already had a
statutory system of publicity rights that was limited to living persons, in
1990 a federal court decided that the state should also have a separate
common law postmortem right of publicity.67  Another federal court
birthed a postmortem right of publicity in Connecticut.68 Even the Sixth
Circuit eventually had to admit defeat. Although the Michigan courts and
legislature had never spoken on the issue, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
"the weight of authority" mandated that a descendible right be
recognized. 69 Today, most courts and commentators agree that the law has
shifted and that publicity rights are descendible.7°
The right also came to be conceptualized in a different way than it had
been in the past. Courts switched to describing the right of publicity as a
robust property right. Rejecting the Sixth Circuit's decision finding no
descendible right of publicity under Tennessee common law, the Crowell
court explained that the right had to be construed as an individual property
63 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/30(b) (2009) (stating that a person may not use an individual's
identity for commercial purposes for fifty years after the date of his or her death); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2741.02(A) (LexisNexis 2008) (stating the general rule that a person shall not use any aspect of
an individual's persona for a commercial purpose for a period of sixty years after his or her death);
WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (2005) ("The property right does not expire upon the death of the
individual or personality .... "); I MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 6:59 (describing Indiana's right of
publicity statute, which became effective in 1994 and protected the identity of both living and deceased
persons).
6' WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.040(2).
65 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 6:59 (describing Indiana's postmortem duration statute as
"one of the most sweeping right of publicity statutes in the nation").
66 IND. CODE § 32-36-1-8 (2002).67 Nature's Way Prods., Inc. v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245, 252-53 (D. Utah 1990)
(holding that the plaintiffs' complaint states a cause of action for which relief may be granted under the
common law right of publicity, which "survives the death of the subject person in cases where he or she
transferred or otherwise exploited such rights while alive").
68 Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 190 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (denying a summary judgment motion on the grounds that there is a descendible right of
publicity under Connecticut law).
69 Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 326 (6th Cir. 2000).
70 See, e.g., DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 6:7 (2006); Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1324 (2002) (stating that, over the past fifty years, state laws have increasingly
treated posthumous commercialization of a decedent's persona as descendible).
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right that includes the "unrestricted right of disposition."71 Affirming the
ability of the estate of Elvis Presley to control use of his name and
likeness, the court labeled the right a "species of intangible personal
property., 72 Similarly, the estate of a child actor was allowed to proceed
with its right of publicity suit because the court deemed the right to be a
property right under New Jersey law.7 3 Other courts construed "celebrity
goodwill" as property subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution of
a marriage.74 State statutes took the same propertization path. Kentucky's
right of publicity statute, enacted in 1984, explicitly described the right as a
"property right., 75 Texas did the same, placing its right of publicity statute
in its property code and defining it as a "property right.
7 6
This maneuver, labeling the right as "property," also allowed the right
to be extracted from its right of privacy origins. The right of privacy is
conceptualized as a "personal" right rather than as a "property" right.77 As
a result, one cannot assign their interest in preventing defamation to a third
party or pass it on to one's heirs after death. But courts in the 1980s were
careful to explain that the right of publicity and the right of privacy were
two different things. In a lengthy exegesis of the doctrine, the Crowell
court emphasized the differences between the right of publicity and the
right of privacy, explaining that Warren and Brandeis had created the right
of privacy for a far different purpose than the right of publicity and that the
publicity right had "to step out of the shadow of its more well known
71 State v. Crowell, 753 S.W.2d 89, 96-97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
72 d. at 97.
73 McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 916-18 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Executors and administrators may
have an action for any trespass done to the person or property... of their testator or intestate against
the trespasser .. ") (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 (West 1987)); see also Grant v. Esquire, 367
F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (comparing appropriation of persona to a trespass on land).
74 Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190, 1193 (N.J. Super. 1988) (holding that "celebrity goodwill"
is an asset which is distributable upon dissolution of marriage if it is acquired during the marriage);
Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 90445 (App. Div. 1991) (reversing a lower court decision which
determined that the plaintiffs celebrity status was not "marital property" subject to equitable
distribution); Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (Sup. Ct. 1988) ("The noncelebrity spouse
should be entitled to a share of the celebrity spouse's fame, limited ... by the degree to which the fame
is attributable to the noncelebrity spouse.") (citing Gary S. Stiffelman, Community Property Interests in
the Right of Publicity: Fame and/or Fortune, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1127-28 (1978)); see also Allen
M. Parkman, Human Capital as Property in Celebrity Divorces, 29 FAM. L.Q. 141, 141-42 (1995)
(discussing expansion of the definition of marital property to include "celebrity status").
75 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West 2006) (recognizing property rights in a person's name
and likeness which are entitled to protection from commercial exploitation); see also JOSHUA GAMSON,
CLAIMS TO FAME: CELEBRITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 45 (1994) (discussing increasing use of
the terms "property" and "merchandise" in popular culture to describe celebrity beginning in the
1950s); Joshua Gamson, The Assembly Line of Greatness: Celebrity in Twentieth-Century America, 9
CULTURAL STUD. MASS COMM. 1, 14 (1992) (same).
76 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (West 2000).
77 Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 70, at 1322.
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cousin., 78 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit articulated a "distinction between
the personal right to be left alone and the business right to control use of
one's identity in commerce. 79
At the same time, judicial attitudes as to what should be part of a
protectable persona shifted. Courts chose to make voice, like name or
likeness, part of the celebrity property right, even if the secondary use was
only a close imitation.8° In 1988, the Ninth Circuit found that Bette Midler
had a viable state common law right of publicity claim against Ford Motors
for using an imitation of her voice. 8' The court explained that "[t]o
impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity., 82  Four years later, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury award of over two million dollars for Frito-
Lay's impersonation of singer Tom Waits' voice in a commercial. 83 "[A]
well-known singer with a distinctive voice has a property right in that
voice," the court stated. 84 Other courts adopted the same reasoning.85 A
related line of cases held that using actors bearing a striking resemblance to
a celebrity in commercial activities violated the right of publicity.86 The
right now extended not just to uses of the celebrity's inherent attributes like
appearance or voice, but to imitations of those attributes.
Courts also recognized claims based on the use of objects associated
with a famous person. When game show hostess Vanna White sued
Samsung Electronics for its advertisement featuring a robot dressed in a
blond wig, gown, and jewelry standing next to a letter board resembling
87the one used on Wheel of Fortune, the Ninth Circuit held in her favor. In
78 State v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
79 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996)
(internal citation omitted); see also Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. LaRue, Nos. 97-6093, 97-6224, 97-
6087, 1998 WL 568321, at *8 (10th Cir. Sept. 1, 1998) ("Differing from the right of privacy, or the
right to be left alone, the right of publicity provides the ability 'to control use of one's identity in
commerce."') (quoting Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 967); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d
70, 82, 85 n.6 (W. Va. 1984) (distinguishing right of privacy, which "protects individual personality
and feelings," from right of publicity, "which remedies the unjust enrichment caused by an
unauthorized exploitation of the good will and reputation that a public figure develops in his name or
likeness").
80 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 4:78 (describing "[a] new era of judicial attitude and analysis
towards sound-alikes" beginning in 1988).
81 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) ("We hold only that when a
distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a
product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California.").
82 d. at 463.
83 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992).84 1d. at 1105.
85 E.g., Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 393-94 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that
an award-winning musician had a property right in his voice and singing style).86 E.g., Prudhomme v. Procter & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390, 393-94 (E.D. La. 1992); Allen v.
Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610, F.
Supp. 612, 629-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
87 White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
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a few previous decisions, courts had recognized right of publicity claims
outside of appropriations of name, photograph, or voice.88 But here the
court recognized such a claim when there was no affirmative
representation that the person depicted in the commercial was in fact the
plaintiff.89  Thus, merely referencing a celebrity could now trigger
liability.90
In a short period of time, then, three doctrinal innovations radically
altered the right of publicity. First, the right became descendible, greatly
strengthening the economic hand of celebrities trying to trade on their fame
with merchandisers. Second, courts finally divorced the right from its
privacy origins, freeing it from previous limitations on relief for non-
dignitary harms. Third, courts chose to broaden the aspects of persona
protected by the right, eventually deciding to protect anything used .by
another that might "identify" the celebrity.9' These changes happened over
three decades after the right was originally introduced in 1953. The
remainder of this Article describes the cultural context in which these
changes occurred and how that context affected lawmakers and judges.
III. COMMODIFYING CELEBRITY
As discussed above, the rights held by celebrities in the 1950s and
88 See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822, 827 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding that a race car driver had a right of publicity in the distinctive design of his race car); Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 725-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that Muhammad Ali had a right of
publicity claim against Playgirl Magazine, in part, for the unauthorized use of his nickname "The
Greatest").
S See White, 971 F.2d at 1403. Simultaneously, courts expanded the bounds of trademark
infringement law, relaxing trademark doctrine to better accommodate celebrity plaintiffs.
Congressional revision of the Lanham Act in 1988 transformed section 43(a) into a powerful weapon,
providing causes of action for infringement of unregistered trademarks as well as false advertising.
Celebrity plaintiffs used both causes of action to halt unwanted uses of their personas. Joshua Beser,
Comment, False Endorsement or First Amendment?: An Analysis of Celebrity Trademark Rights and
Artistic Expression, 41 SAN DIEGo L. Rav. 1787, 1804 (2004) ("Since the mid-1980s, courts have
increasingly recognized celebrities' claims under the Lanham Act as unregistered trademarks protected
by section 43(a)."); see, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that
civil rights icon Rosa Parks had a trademark interest in her name); King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d
824, 829 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding for author Stephen King on his false advertising claim for a false
"possessory credit" in motion picture); Vanderbilt v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc., No. 88 CIV. 8263
(SWK), 1990 WL 37825, at * 1-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1990) (finding that a member of the Vanderbilt
family had standing to sue under the Lanham Act when his name was misappropriated in a Rolls-Royce
advertisement); Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 624-25 (holding that use of a Woody Allen look-alike in an
advertisement was in violation of the Lanham Act).
90 Even using a baseball pitcher's distinctive stance in an advertisement was deemed actionable.
See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691-93 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that a pitcher's
stance rendered him identifiable and could be the basis for a cause of action for commercial
misappropriation).
91 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 3.18 (stating that "[i]dentifiability... is a central element
of a right of publicity claim").
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1960s were not nearly as powerful as the rights they wielded in the 1980s
and 1990s. In a short period of time, the right of publicity morphed from a
limited personal right protecting a living celebrity's name and likeness into
an expansive, descendible property right that extended to all aspects of
persona. Legal scholars tie the right's growth to the increasing economic
importance of celebrity. Their argument is straightforward: once celebrity
reached a critical amount of commercial value in the mid-twentieth
century, judges believed they had no choice but to recognize that value.92
Courts were aware of the financial advantages of celebrity throughout
the twentieth century. It was no secret that advertisers were willing to pay
handsomely to use celebrity names and pictures to stimulate demand for
their merchandise.93 One of the earliest publicity cases involved Thomas
Edison suing for the unauthorized use of his name and likeness on a type of
pain relief medicine. 94  In finding for the famous inventor, the court
explained that one's name and "the peculiar cast of one's features" may
have a "pecuniary value" that belongs to a single individual.95 By the
middle of the century, the commercial significance of fame was well
understood.96 The Haelan decision, credited with coining the term "right
of publicity," maintained that it was "common knowledge" that many
actors and professional athletes capitalize on their fame through
advertisements that further emphasize their celebrity.97
But judicial acknowledgement of celebrity's financial value does not
explain the right's dramatic expansion in the century's last two decades. If
judges knew about fame's economic importance in the 1950s, then why
was this expansion delayed for thirty years? For that matter, the Edison
case (and others) demonstrate legal awareness of celebrity's value decades
before the right's creation and nearly a century before the right became
descendible. If all it took for the creation of a new property right was
judicial recognition of economic value, the right of publicity should have
become a part of American law much earlier.
92 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also P. David Marshall, Introduction, in THE
CELEBRITY CULTURE READER, supra note 8, at 1, 6 ("Branding public identity is a clear translation of a
personality into a commodity that is brokered and exchanged throughout the extended entertainment
industry."); Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A
Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, 12 (1985) ("[T]he idea
of 'valuableness' or 'pecuniary value' has been the key element in the widespread recognition of the
right.").
93 See O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1941) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[Advertisers] are undoubtedly in the habit of buying the right to use one's name or picture to create
demand and good will for their merchandise.").
94 Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 392 (N.J. Ch. 1907).
95 Id. at 394.
9 6 STUART EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLITICS OF STYLE IN CONTEMPORARY
CULTURE 98 (1988); Madow, supra note 2, at 163, 166.
97 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
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Instead, the story is more nuanced and requires an examination of the
history of celebrity on multiple fronts. Subsequent parts of this Article
examine how celebrity came to appear more democratic and rational to
lawmakers and to the general public. This Part traces how celebrity was
viewed economically in the 1980s and 1990s. Technological change
altered the financial understanding of celebrity in two key ways. First, the
perceived value of celebrity skyrocketed as media proliferation and
globalization placed a higher premium on being famous. Second,
television caused the rewards of celebrity to shift their location from movie
studios and sports leagues to the famous individual herself. Both of these
changes had a dramatic impact on how the public and the legal elite
assessed celebrity's economic implications.
A. Celebrity Gains in Value
Celebrity surely had commercial value throughout the twentieth
century, but in the 1980s technology caused that value to increase
exponentially. Celebrities began to sign massive endorsement deals that
dwarfed the payments they received for actually performing on the screen
or in the sporting arena.98 Famous people have long been used as
commercial spokespersons, but it was only in recent years that such
endorsements eclipsed the compensation received for "professional"
activities. For example, Mickey Mantle received only $1,500 for lending
his name to a chewing gum manufacturer in 1961.99 By contrast, Michael
Jackson inaugurated a new age of celebrity advertising in 1984 when he
signed a then record five million dollar sponsorship deal with Pepsi.'00
"The pact raised the price tag for celebrity pitchmen for years to come, and
cleared the way for a wave of star-studded commercials . . . ."10' A year
later, Nike entered into a partnership with basketball player Michael Jordan
that not only rewarded him handsomely for appearing in its commercials,
but also enhanced his fame by using cinematic techniques to turn him from
an athlete into an entertainer. 102 The next year, Coca-Cola paid Bill Cosby
twenty-five million dollars to serve as its spokesperson.13 It quickly
became commonplace for the biggest stars to leverage their fame through
multi-million dollar endorsement deals.' 4 When NBA star Allen Iverson
98 See Robert A. Swerdlow & Marleen R. Swerdlow, Celebrity Endorsers: Spokesperson
Selection Criteria and Case Examples ofFREDD, 7 ACAD. MKTG. STUD. J. 13, 14 (2003) (discussing
the increasing use of celebrity endorsements in advertising).
99 KERRY SEGRAVE, ENDORSEMENTS IN ADVERTISING: A SOCIAL HISTORY 101 (2005).
100 Suzanne Vranica, Jackson Popularized Celebrity Ads, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2009, at B5.
101 Id.
102 NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO 51-52 (2002).
103 .F Hutton 's Spokesman Idea a 'Cos' Celebre, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 21, 1986, at I.
104 Other blockbuster endorsement deals of the time include Madonna's agreement with Pepsi in
1989 and Shaquille O'Neal's deal with Reebok in 1993. See Sid Bernstein, True Stardom,
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entered into a fifty million dollar deal with a shoe manufacturer in 1996,
his coach quipped, "[t]he company Allen's with is Reebok, not us. ' 105
Two forces permitted the change in celebrity value. The first was a
proliferation of media outlets that began in the 1980s, when the public
suddenly had access to a vastly wider array of media than ever before.
0 6
A television viewer in the 1970s only had a few channels to pick from; just
a few years later, cable television and home video devices offered
hundreds of simultaneous viewing possibilities. 0 7 To provide the needed
content for these new entertainment outlets, media companies needed
celebrities. They invested in a range of programming formats designed to
create and emphasize fame.' 0 8 The new technologies increased celebrity
worth as entertainers and athletes could make themselves known to a much
greater number of consumers than their predecessors.'0 9 The proliferation
of ways for celebrities to publicize themselves also amplified the
attractiveness of celebrity endorsers as famous faces could cut through the
media clutter. By the middle of the decade, approximately twenty percent
of all television commercials featured a famous person, 10 and celebrity
endorsement deals comprised ten percent of all of the money spent on
television advertising."'
Globalization also changed the economic calculus of fame and, again,
technology was a driving force. As information could be shared across
continents in increasingly compact, cost-effective ways, massive media
conglomerates seized on celebrities as a way to translate their content
across different media platforms and different cultural environments."
2
ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 16, 1989, at 16 (noting Madonna's 1989 agreement with Pepsi); Ken
Rappoport, O'NealAppeal: Big Deal, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at Cl (discussing O'Neal's long-term
advertising contracts worth seventy million dollars).
105 Michael Bamberger, Mining Woods for Gold, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 25,2000, at 27.
106 See CASHMORE, supra note 4, at 38-39 (discussing the transformative role of television in
creating celebrity culture); DAVID GILES, ILLUSIONS OF IMMORTALITY: A PSYCHOLOGY OF FAME AND
CELEBRITY 32 (2000) (describing how the expansion of mass media has contributed to the creation of
celebrities); JAKE HALPERN, FAME JUNKIES: THE HIDDEN TRUTHS BEHIND AMERICA'S FAVORITE
ADDICTION, at xx-xxi (2007) (discussing the increasingly broad range of programming available on
cable television).
107 HALPERN, supra note 106, at xx-xxi.
108 NEW KEYWORDS: A REVISED VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 27-28 (Tony Bennett
et al. eds., 2005). A person living in pre-World War II America could go days without ever seeing a
celebrity, but this was no longer true decades later when the average home had access to channel after
channel devoted to celebrities. See HALPERN, supra note 106, at xx-xxi (discussing the increasing
public access to celebrity-focused publications and cable television shows).
109 The author thanks Greg Mandel for his helpful discussion on this point.
110 See Pat Sloan & Stuart J. Elliot, Adwhirl, ADVERTISING AGE, July 13, 1987, at 88.
... See Stratford P. Sherman, When You Wish Upon a Star, FORTUNE, Aug. 19, 1985, available at
http://money.cnn.comlmagazine/fortunearchive/I 985/08/19/66318/index.htm).
'
2 See NEIL GABLER, THE NORMAN LEAR CENTER, TOWARD A NEW DEFINITION OF CELEBRITY
10-11 (2001) (describing how the adaptable nature of celebrity is used to sell magazines, television,
newspapers, books, and online content); see also KLEIN, supra note 102, at 57 (2002) (discussing the
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Thus, instead of MGM trying to use Greta Garbo and Joan Crawford to sell
tickets for Grand Hotel in the United States, vertically integrated media
corporations used a star like Arnold Schwarzenegger to sell books, CDs,
DVDs, television rebroadcasts, television spin-offs, theme park attractions,
as well as tickets for the next Terminator movie both in the United States
and overseas. Globalization also allowed celebrities concerned with the
clash between commercialization and artistic integrity to have it both ways,
as they could receive massive paydays for appearing in commercials in
countries like Japan-where they were unlikely to face criticism-while
refusing to appear in advertisements at home.'
1 13
Perhaps the most significant change in the commercial power of fame
was not in its magnitude, but in its fluidity. Commodities are those objects
that have an economic value determined by reciprocal exchange.1 14  In
prior decades, fame was not a true commodity because its primary value
was tied to one's abilities as an actor or athlete, making it difficult to
transfer this value to others. Admittedly, early twentieth century
celebrities did enter into endorsement deals. But the scope and amount of
these endorsement deals were limited. Studios policed their stars' outside
commercial appearances to make sure they tightly matched their on-screen
personas." 5 Athletes of the era shilled for sporting equipment and certain
"manly" vices, but most other products were considered too far removed
from their athletic personas.' 1 6 Given these limitations and the relatively
low value of celebrity endorsement deals at the time, the ability to use
one's name and likeness to sell goods seemed like a worthwhile sideline,
but not the main financial benefit of being a movie star or athlete.
By the 1980s, the remunerative value of celebrity was no longer
media versatility of celebrity athletes); GRAEME TURNER, UNDERSTANDING CELEBRITY 32-33 (2004)
(explaining how transnational companies have expanded by diversifying their holdings, particularly by
expanding into entertainment platforms).
"1 See SEGRAVE, supra note 99, at 112-13 (presenting a list of Western celebrities who
participated in advertisement campaigns in Japan, including Sylvester Stallone for Kirin beer, Paul
Newman for Nissan, and Madonna for Mitsubishi Electric); see also Malena Watrous, How U.S. Stars
Sell Japan to the Japanese, SALON.COM, June 29, 2000, http://www.salon.com/2000/06/29/
japoncelebs/ (explaining how many American celebrities, and particularly Arnold Schwarzenegger,
continue to perform in Japanese commercials, even as they refuse to do so in the United States).
"4 See Arjun Appadurai, Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE SOCIAL
LIFE OF THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 3 (Aijun Appadurai ed., 1986)
(explaining that commodities can be defined as entities possessing economic value).
11 See infra Section IlI.B.
116 See Craig T. Bogar, Trends in Product Endorsements by Athletes, 17 SPORT DIGEST no. 1,
2010, available at http://thesportdigest.com/archive/article/trends-product-endorsements-athletes
(explaining that athletes in the earlier part of the century rarely advertised products that were not
related to their sport, while current sports endorsements cover a wide breadth of products unrelated to
sports).
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tethered to one's accomplishments." 7 Now what mattered was becoming
famous; how one achieved this fame was less important. Once fame had
been achieved, earlier career paths could be abandoned, as the essential
task became keeping oneself in the public eye. Consultants advised
celebrities to "extend their brand" by leveraging their fame in one
commercial area to become known in a completely different one." 
8
Examples from the time include golfer Greg Norman, who translated his
1980s fame as a professional golfer into vitaculture; actor Paul Newman,
who used his acting renown to sell his own line of food products; and
model Kathy Ireland, who built a one billion dollar business selling a
variety of retail products including apparel, flooring, and lighting." 9 In the
1990s, a parade of hip-hop artists began their own clothing lines.120 Soon
thereafter a host of celebrities, particularly female singers, started offering
their own signature fragrances. 12 1  Some celebrities even took steps to
securitize their identities by offering publicly traded bonds backed by the
entertainer's own fame and iconic status.1
22
Legal authorities commented on the changes to celebrity value,
particularly its newly fluid nature. As the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia noted in 1987, modem celebrities "are frequently so famous
that they may be able to transfer their recognition and influence from one
field to another.' ' 123  Other courts recognized that the economic value of
celebrity endorsements now outweighed whatever benefits accrued from
the events that made the celebrity famous in the first place.
124
117 See NEW KEYWORDS, supra note 108, at 27-28 (explaining that being a "star" typically entails
an accretion of performance accomplishments over time, but "celebrities" are not required to build this
foundation).
118 See Chris Grannell & Ruwan Jayawardena, Celebrity Branding: Not as Glamorous as It Looks,
BRAND CHANNEL, January 19, 2004, available at http://www.brandchannel.com/brand_
speak.asp?bsjd=76.
"' See John Tozzi, Celebrity Entrepreneurs, Bus. WEEK, June 20, 2007, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/june2007/5b20070620.093752.htm (describing how
different celebrities extended their brand into other markets).
120 See Emil Wilbekin, Great Aspirations: Hip Hop and Fashion Dress for Excess and Success, in
THE VIBE HISTORY OF Hip HOP 280, 283 (1999) (listing the hip-hop stars that started their own clothing
lines).
121 See CHANDLER BuRR, THE PERFECT SCENT: A YEAR INSIDE THE PERFUME INDUSTRY IN PARIS
AND NEW YORK, at xxi (2007) (listing the celebrities who started their own perfume brands, including
Gwen Stefani, C6line Dion, Shania Twain, and Kate Moss).
122 See IRVING J. REIN ET AL., HIGH VISIBILITY 238 (1997); see also Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra
note 70, at 1331 (describing how David Bowie started the celebrity trend of securitizing one's identity);
Daniel Kadlec, Banking on the Stars, TIME, June 2000, available at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,998239,00.html (noting how in 1997, David Bowie offered "Bowie Bonds,"
with other celebrity musicians like James Brown and Marvin Gay soon following suit).
123 Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted).
124 See Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 867 F. Supp. 175, 189 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (stating that "in an age where star athletes make tenfold more from their endorsement contracts
than from their team salaries, it denies reality to believe other than that an individual's persona can
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As fame came to be perceived more like a true commodity, courts
began to view celebrity as an essential part of modem capitalism. Even
though celebrities and their licensees only enjoy some of their economic
prosperity by virtue of decisions in favor of strong, descendible publicity
rights, courts and commentators have cited reliance on such legal
protections as a primary reason for continuing the right's expansion.
125
Judges also expressed concern in their decisions for the role of celebrity
protections in bolstering the American economy. 126 In their view, a regime
that does not robustly safeguard celebrity interests threatens international
trade. 127  Likewise, legislatures in the 1980s and 1990s explicitly
recognized the newly fluid nature of celebrity value and stressed the need
to rewrite the law to capture this value for state coffers. The House
sponsor of Texas's postmortem statute, passed in 1987, explained that "it is
important for us in our economic development in our state to provide some
protections for entertainers"'' 28 and extolled the bill's potential to make
Texas "the third coast in the entertainment industry.' ' 129  Similarly,
Washington's legislature noted the growing economic importance of
celebrity endorsements and adopted its law to encourage business
relocation. 3 ° Nevada legislators noted that such a law would encourage
Las Vegas entertainers to keep their estates, "the focal centers for the
control of assets that survive long after their death," in Nevada.13' In the
past, one's fame could be protected by safeguarding the conditions of the
celebrity's original livelihood. Now, however, fame had a value of its
own, and legal authorities began to take steps to retain that value within
their jurisdictions.
constitute valuable economic property"); see also State v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 94 (Tenn. App.
1987) (discussing the new world of commercial exploitation of celebrities and the lucrative world of
celebrity endorsements as "economic reality"). In contrast, a court in 1959 commented that one's name
could never be a "commodity." Application of N.Y. Braves Baseball Club, 195 N.Y.S.2d 80, 83 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
125 See Kwall, supra note 16, at 199; Bela G. Lugosi, California Expands the Statutory Right of
Publicity for Deceased Celebrities While Its Courts are Examining the First Amendment Limitations of
that Statute, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. POL'Y 259, 271 (2000); see also Commentary by New
York Senator Emanuel R. Gold on N.Y.S.B. 155, N.Y. 218th General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1995) (on
file with author) (arguing that a publicity rights law was needed in New York because "[ain entire
industry has developed around the merchandising and commercial exploitation of celebrities").
126 See, e.g., Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 92, 94 (emphasizing the "economic reality" of the large
market that had already developed for celebrity merchandise in deciding to recognize postmortem
common law right).
127 See Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 51.
128 Audio tape: Texas House of Representatives, Floor Debate (Apr. 9, 1987) (on file with the
author).
129 Audio tape: Texas House of Representatives, Judicial Affairs Committee (Mar. 11, 1987) (on
file with the author).
' H.R. Rep. No. 55-1074, at 5 (Wash. 1998).
131 Minutes of the Assembly Committee on Commerce, 65th Nev. Leg., exhibit D, June 16, 1989
(on file with the author).
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B. Celebrities Take Financial Control
Although the increasing value of celebrity encouraged courts to
recognize publicity rights, it was not enough. Another barrier to fuller
recognition of celebrity rights can be traced to understandings of where the
economic power of celebrity was located. In the first half of the twentieth
century, "film performers were essentially studio owned-and-operated
commodities."'' 32  The studios exercised tight control over their stars,
designing their personalities and scripting their publicity. 33 Some studio
contracts even prohibited public laughter. 34 A close match between on-
screen and off-screen personas was designed to assure audiences of the
star's authenticity. 135  Because performers often played larger-than-life
heroes and heroines, their off-screen personalities had to seem larger than
life as well.
As part of this process, studios held legal control over celebrity
identities. 36  Box office stars worked under contracts that allowed the
star's name, voice, and likeness to be used to promote studio films and
even to be licensed for product endorsements without the star's
approval. 137  "Movie studios could use a star's image as it related to a
particular film, and could license that image to businesses that produced
greeting cards, toys, and a myriad of other kinds of products in exchange
for a royalty payment to the star image's owner, by outside businesses.
During this period, except for a rare few, such as Shirley Temple and Roy
Rogers, film celebrities lacked the ability to control uses of their image by
the movie studios, and, therefore, only received a fraction of their
persona's overall commercial worth. 139 For example, the studios agreed to
132 GAMSON, supra note 75, at 5; see also DREW PINSKY & S. MARK YOUNG, THE MIRROR
EFFECT: How CELEBRITY NARCISSISM IS SEDUCING AMERICA 33 (2009) ("Stars were little more than
well-paid employees who could be rented or sold to other studios for profit.").
133 See GAMSON, supra note 75, at 5 (explaining how studios controlled their stars' exposure to
the public).
134 See id. at 25 (noting that Buster Keaton's contract prohibited him from laughing in public).
135 See Cathy Klaprat, The Star as Market Strategy: Bette Davis in Another Light, in THE
AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 351, 365-67 (Tino Bailo ed., 1985) (describing how the studio controlled
every aspect of Bette Davis's image).
136 PINSKY & YOUNG, supra note 132, at 33.
137 See McLeod, supra note 8, at 653 ("Contracts enabled movie studios to use a star's name,
voice and likeness to promote the film, and more underhandedly, it allowed for the use of a star's
image to be licensed for product endorsements, even in the most questionable and tangential
circumstances."); see also K.L. Lum et al., Signed, Sealed and Delivered- "Big Tobacco" in
Hollywood, 1927-1951, 17 TOBACCO CONTROL 313, 318 (2008) (describing studio control over
celebrity cigarette testimonials).
138 McLeod, supra note 8, at 653; see also SEGRAVE, supra note 99 at 23 ("Some contracts
included a clause stating that the stars would not sign any testimonials except through the film studio's
manager or publicity director. On the other hand, the studio could sign for the star.").
139 See McLeod, supra note 8, at 653 (describing how Shirley Temple and Roy Rogers capitalized
on their fame through various merchandising and licensing arrangements).
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allow Lux soap to run advertisements featuring hundreds of famous female
film stars without paying the actresses a dime. 140  In addition to being
unable to realize the full value of their celebrity in the endorsement market,
film stars received salaries rather than a percentage of a film's profits.
141
Although the studios attempted to mask any signs of labor struggle, the
public quickly became aware of their controlling hand. Bette Davis very
publicly protested what she saw as forced placement in mediocre films in
the 1930s. 142 The Screen Actors Guild staged a protest in the 1950s in an
effort to prevent the studios from typecasting actors. 143 James Cagney and
Olivia de Haviland took the studios to court in an effort to break out of
their long-term contracts.] 44
As a result of the "significant hold" of the studios over their stars, 145 it
was difficult for courts to justify the right of publicity in a manner similar
to other intellectual property rights. The primary argument used today for
awarding private control over celebrity personas is an incentive one,146
matching the theoretical justification behind other types of intellectual
property like copyright and patents. 147 According to this view, by giving
celebrities legal authority over commercial use of their image, the law
encourages others to develop their own rich cultural personalities with the
knowledge that they will be able to capture the benefits of their
investment. 148 Yet the structure of the entertainment industry in the first
half of the twentieth century made it hard to believe that an award of
publicity rights would incentivize the creation of new captivating personas.
Stars operated within a regime that placed economic and creative control in
140 SEGRAVE, supra note 99, at 189-90.
141 RICHARD SCHICKEL, INTIMATE STRANGERS: THE CULTURE OF CELEBRITY 96 (1985) (noting
that many celebrities resented the disparity between their salary and what studios were making off of
their work).
142 See Allen Larson, Movies and New Constructions of the American Star, in AMERICAN CINEMA
OF THE 1930s: THEMES AND VARIATIONS 182, 184 (Ina Rae Hark ed., 2007).
43 Typecasting Protested by Actors Guild, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1950, at 17.
'44 Emily S. Carman, Independent Stardom. Female Film Stars and the Studio System in the
1930s, 37 WOMEN'S STUD. 583, 588 (2008).
145 Nicola Simpson, Coming Attractions: A Comparative History of the Hollywood Studio System
and the Porn Business, 24 HIST. J. FILM, RADIO, & TELEVISION 635, 639 (2004).
146 Wall, supra note 28, at 56 (providing an example of the current view taken by the courts); see
also Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Protecting one's name or likeness
from misappropriation is socially beneficial because it encourages people to develop special skills,
which then can be used for commercial advantage."); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1186-90
(describing and criticizing the argument that the right of publicity is necessary "to encourage
investment in the development of a public persona").
147 See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside ofIntellectual Property's Downside,
57 UCLA L. REv. 921, 922 & n.2 (2010) (stating that patent and copyright law follow the incentive
model).
148See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1992) (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the evolving case law).
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the hands of non-celebrities. 149  Publicity rights inured to the benefit of
movie studios, not those actually responsible for creating new personas.150
The early cases and commentary did not discuss incentives when
evaluating publicity rights. Instead, unjust enrichment of the defendant or
harm to the dignitary interests of the plaintiff was stressed.151 The problem
for celebrities, however, was that a focus on dignitary interests did not
counsel in favor of strong protections. 1
52
Beginning in the 1950s, this all began to change as the celebrities
themselves came to exercise more control over their careers and the
commercial use of their personas. Again, technological change was an
integral part of the story as the new medium of television helped end the
period of control over performer images by shrinking movie audiences and
introducing a new competitor to the studios. 53 Meanwhile, an antitrust
decree forced the studios to divest themselves of their interest in theaters,
dramatically reducing box office revenue and weakening their bargaining
position with celebrities. 54  With the studios no longer completely
controlling publicity for their actors, agents stepped in to shepherd their
clients through the media production system. 55  The agents and their
clients had different publicity objectives than the studio heads. Whereas
the studios were most concerned about publicizing their films, "[t]he
agent's fundamental intention is to construct the star as a clearly separate
economic entity, quite distinct from any individual film or any studio."' 5 6
In other words, celebrity publicity's fundamental purpose became
economic independence for the individual star. By highlighting the actor's
own gifts, the agent could position the star for other projects and distance
her from a particular studio or type of role. As a result, celebrities of the
149 See SCHICKEL, supra note 141, at 96-97 (describing the extensive control that studios were
able to exert over their actors).
'
5 Id. at 96.
151 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80-81 (Ga. 1905) (describing the
emotional harms to plaintiff from unauthorized advertising); Palmer v. Schonhorm Enters., Inc., 232
A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1967) (speculating that "the basic and underlying theory" behind the right
of publicity is to protect the celebrity plaintiff from "unjustified interference"); Edward J. Bloustein,
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 987-88
(1964) (justifying action against commercial uses of a person's name or photograph for the resulting
injury "to the sense of personal dignity"); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966) (maintaining that the rationale for the
right of publicity "is the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good
will").
152 See supra Section H.A.
153 SCHICKEL, supra note 141, at 97.
154 See Greg Snodgrass, Business Solutions to the Alien Ownership Restriction, 61 FED. COMM.
L.J. 457, 461-63 (2009) (discussing United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948)).
15 P. DAVID MARSHALL, CELEBRITY AND POWER: FAME IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 84-85
(1997).
116 Id. at 84.
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1960s and 1970s began to present their talents in a different way than they
had before when their public personas were under studio control.
Entertainers began to stress their own creativity in performance,
deemphasizing outside instruction and emphasizing internal resources.
157
Method acting allowed the film star to argue that she was not just a
performer in a system orchestrated by others, but rather someone involved
in a great individual, artistic endeavor, just like a writer or a painter. 118
With the individual entertainer coming to exercise sole dominion over the
management of her public life, there was a stronger argument for allowing
her to capture the full benefits of economic use of her image.
Legal decisions regarding publicity rights changed to reflect the
understanding that celebrities now managed their own personas. With
control over publicity in the hands of the celebrity, courts could begin to
tell a story of incentives when justifying an award of rights in persona to
one individual. The Supreme Court, in its only treatment of the right of
publicity, explained in 1977 that "the protection [afforded by state right of
publicity laws] provides an economic incentive for [the artist] to make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public.
This same consideration underlies the patent and copyright laws."'5 9 The
First Circuit also maintained that the right's goal was "rewarding
individual effort."' 160 According to the Seventh Circuit in 1986, "[t]he
reason that state law protects individual pecuniary interests [via the right]
is to provide an incentive to performers to invest the time and resources
required to develop such performances."'
161
This shift to a focus on using legal privileges to encourage the
development of celebrity fit nicely with a larger trend in legal thought that
emphasized the importance of designing legal rules to facilitate markets
and wealth maximization.1 62 Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
jurists and academics, such as Richard Posner and Gary Becker, began
arguing that economic theory could best explain human behavior and
called for the logic of markets to be employed in a variety of socio-legal
contexts such as discrimination, drug addiction, and adoption.163 Rather
than just describing the best approach to certain economic or political
' See id. at 88-89.
158 SCHICKEL, supra note 141, at 98.
159 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
160 Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co., Inc., 757 F.2d 440, 444-45 (1st Cir. 1985).
161 Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 678 (7th Cir.
1986); see also Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983)
("Vindication of the right will tend to encourage achievement in [the entertainer's] chosen field.").
162 See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980's, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 604-14
(1989) (describing the early history of the law and economics movement); see also Richard A. Posner,
Gary Becker's Contributions to Law and Economics, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 211, 212 (1993).
163 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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challenges, to these theorists, free market ideology was the appropriate
paradigm for social life in general. 164 Hence, once it became accepted that
law and economics principles could be applied to the world of
entertainment, it made sense to use the law to encourage aspiring
celebrities to engage in rational behavior that would lead to the best quality
product from the celebrity marketplace. Modem courts continue to offer
the same rationale of using publicity rights to incentivize the production of
new public identities. 161
In sum, although lawmakers have always recognized that celebrity has
value, the way they conceptualized that value changed at the century's end.
Technological and social developments produced a new economic
understanding of celebrity. Now, fame was not only lucrative, but it was
worth orders of magnitude more than the actual skills or performances
underlying it. It became a significant part of global capitalism, and the
celebrity herself could now reap its primary rewards. These changes may
have allowed lawmakers to ignore some of their earlier qualms with
celebrity rights. Nonetheless, other non-economic concerns over
celebrity's irrational basis and its undemocratic nature had to be overcome
as well before the right of publicity could resemble other types of property.
Those concerns, and the manner in which they were alleviated, are
discussed in Parts IV and V.
IV. RATIONALIZING CELEBRITY
Another barrier to greater legal protections for the famous was
celebrity's perceived irrationality. Throughout the nineteenth and much of
the twentieth centuries, a suspicion of the psychological basis of celebrity
limited enthusiasm for publicity rights. Elites tied mass popularity to a
more generalized fear of the destabilizing influence of groupthink. Yet by
the late twentieth century, fame had become largely rationalized. The
power embodied in fame began to appear quantifiable and manageable
thanks to a concerted movement by public relations professionals to
'64 Eric M. Fink, Post-Realism, or the Jurisprudential Logic of Late Capitalism: A Socio-Legal
Analysis of theRise and Diffusion of Law and Economics, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 947 & n.103 (2004).
165 Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Both copyright and
the right of publicity are means of protecting an individual's investment in his or her artistic labors.");
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The
principal economic argument made in support of the right of publicity is that it provides an incentive
for creativity and achievement."); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994)
("Protecting one's name and likeness from misappropriation is socially beneficial because it
encourages people to develop special skills, which then can be used for commercial advantage."); see
also N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Trusts & Estates Law Section, Committee on Legislation, Legislation
Report, June 22, 1990 ("[T]he right of publicity is seen as being analogous to a copyright. For both,
creative and intellectual efforts are rewarded and encouraged .... "). But see Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at
973-74 (considering and rejecting the incentives argument).
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change elite opinion and elevate their own status. Public relations, once an
unsystematic approach to managing public opinion and creating celebrity,
became a respected profession that employed specialized, scientific
methods. These changes helped lawmakers abandon their reservations
over particularized perks for the famous.
A. Celebrity as Public Pathology
Elites have long feared the public's adoration of the famous. In Julius
Caesar, William Shakespeare describes the crowds that welcomed Caesar
back to Rome as "worse than senseless things. 166  Fame scared many
nineteenth and early twentieth century intellectuals because it suggested
instability. A deep-rooted fear of the mob gripped Europe after the French
Revolution, and continued into the Victorian Era.167 As described by P.
David Marshall, "crowd theorists" writing in the 1800s struggled to define
the new phenomenon of mass society and how it worked. 68 According to
these theorists, the problem with leaders drawing their strength from
popular sentiment was that the ardor of the populace was unmanageable.
169
French social psychologist Gustave Le Bon forecast a new era dominated
by "crowds," which he explained "reason falsely and are not to be
influenced by reasoning.' 70  The masses threatened to not only remove
elites from power but also to bestow their affections on other leaders
irrationally, something that struck at the stability needed for capitalist
enterprise. "[O]nly by obtaining some sort of insight into the psychology
of crowds" could elites understand "how slight is the action upon them of
laws and institutions. ' 71
As the technologies of the twentieth century allowed more and more
people to gain fame, intellectuals continued to suspect that the public
bestowed its favors based on illogical and socially unproductive thinking.
In a theory that heavily influenced subsequent studies of celebrity,
166 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act. 1, sc. 1.
167 See MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 29 ("[T]he threat of the seething mob born from the
sentiments of equality became a cause of great concern for various elites in the nineteenth century.");
Henry R. Winkler, English Historians on the French Revolution, 9 HIST. & THEORY 236, 240 (1970)
(book review) ("They shared with their contemporaries a genuine and deep-rooted fear of the mob that
was one of the hallmarks of the first half of the century.").
168 MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 28 (noting that this "heralded not the birth of the crowd but the
birth of the power of the crowd" as before that point "most popular uprisings had been ineffectual in
transforming society").
'
6 9 Id. at 28-30.
70 GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND 52-53 (2d ed. 1968); see
also STUART EWEN, PR!: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN 64-66 (1996) (explaining Le Bon's influence on
future social theorists and publicists); LARRY TYE, THE FATHER OF SPIN: EDWARD BERNAYS & THE
BIRTH OF PUBLIC RELATIONS 94 (1998) ("Le Bon raised the specter of a frightening new era dominated
by the masses, by a crowd unbound by the rules of reason that governed the middle class.").
171 LE BON, supra note 170, at xxi-xxii.
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sociologist Max Weber identified charisma, a quality often ascribed to
celebrities, 172 as a common mechanism for leadership. 173  For Weber,
charisma was a non-economic type of social control, one that was in
fundamental tension with economic interests. 174  A few years later,
theorists of the Frankfurt School contended that the public irrationally
placed their trust in celebrities, thereby unknowingly disenfranchising
themselves. Specifically addressing the question of modem fame, Theodor
Adomo and Max Horkheimer located celebrity within "the culture
industry."' 175  According to them, consumers of celebrity culture
unwittingly had a capitalist power structure imprinted on their minds that
they blindly followed.
76
What united these thinkers was a belief that celebrity was an irrational
and potentially harmful phenomenon. Weber described charismatic
leadership, in its purest form, as "a turbulently emotional life that knows
no economic rationality. ... ""', For Adomo and Horkheimer, rather than
acting in rational self-interest, the public consumed celebrity in an
irrational and destructive way. 178  These concerns were mirrored in
discussions of fandom provided by early and mid-twentieth-century
172 See GAMSON, supra note 75, at 8 (stating that charisma is one of the qualities that was
necessary to help certain people to become stars and rise to fame); Jessica Evans, Celebrity, Media, and
History, in UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: INSIDE CELEBRITY 11, 17 (Jessica Evans & David Hesmondhalgh
eds., 2005) ("What is a celebrity? Celebrities are, of course, meant to be remarkable people, who have
charismatic appeal and extraordinary qualities .... "); see also Ronald E. Riggio, Charisma: What Is
It? Do You Have It?, PSYCH. TODAY (Feb. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/cutting-edge-leadership/201002/charisma-what-is-it-do-you-
have-it (listing celebrities and other well-known popular figures as examples of charismatic people).
"' See Nick Stevenson, Audiences and Celebrity, in UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: INSIDE CELEBRITY
supra note 172, at 138 ("One way of understanding celebrities . . . is that they are charismatic
individuals.... Weber argued that charisma represents a specific form of domination in the modem
era."). Film historian Richard Dyer explored the nature of charisma for celebrities, explaining that the
term, as a definition presented by Weber, points to "a certain quality of an individual personality by
virtue of which he is [sic] set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural,
superhuman or least superficially exceptional qualities." Richard Dyer, Charisma, in STARDOM:
INDUSTRY OF DESIRE 57, 57 (Christine Gledhill ed., 1991); see also MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 20-
22 (explaining how Weber's conceptual development of the word charisma has significantly
contributed to the study of leadership).
174 2 Max WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1120 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978);
see also Louis Schneider, Max Weber: Wisdom and Science in Sociology, 12 SOC. Q. 462,463 (1971).
175 Max Horkheimer & Theodor W. Adomo, The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass
Deception, in MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES: KEYWORKS 71, 100 (Meenakshi Gigi Durham &
Douglas M. Kellner eds., 2002); see also MARIA STURKEN & LISA CARTWRIGHT, PRACTICES OF
LOOKING: AN INTRODUCTION TO VISUAL CULTURE 164-68 (2001) (describing the influence of the
Frankfurt School theorists' critique of mass media).
176 See Horkheimer & Adomo, supra note 175, at 79 ("Capitalist production so confines them,
body and soul, that they fall helpless victims to what is offered them.").
177 2 WEBER, supra note 174, at 1120.
178 Horkheimer & Adomo, supra note 175, at 44-45; see also THE FRANKFURT INSTITUTE FOR
SOCIAL RESEARCH, ASPECTS OF SOCIOLOGY 94-95 (John Viertel trans., Beacon Press 1972) (1956)
(discussing how people have become functionaries of celebrity culture).
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psychologists and journalists. Harvard psychologist Hugo Munsterberg
explained how celluloid stars, aided by the techniques of moviemaking,
triggered powerful emotional responses in audiences. 179  Hollywood
columnist Louella Parsons decried the "mob violence that seems to be
spreading across our nation wherever stars appear."' 80 The New Yorker
labeled the scene of thousands of fans trying to get into a 1944 Frank
Sinatra concert as "a terrifying phenomenon of mass hysteria that is seen
only two or three times in a century."' 81 This fear of celebrity audiences
was not confined to the elite. As historian Samantha Barbas writes, even
as box office revenues surged, many Americans of the time became
convinced of the pathology of the average film enthusiast. 182
These concerns over the irrational nature of celebrity translated into a
distrust of celebrity publicity. Inherent in the nature of celebrity is
management of the images transmitted to the public. At this point, rather
than being a respected profession, the public relations industry was
disparaged and its practitioners lacked professional status. Publicity
techniques of the time, like writing up stories in column format that could
easily be pasted into newspapers and sent unsolicited to editors, required
little specialized knowledge or training.183 After World War II, publicists
were increasingly tasked with enhancing the reputation of individuals,
particularly politicians. But these efforts to manipulate the forces of
reputation and celebrity were largely ad hoc. 84 There was little suggestion
that a blueprint had been found for manufacturing fame. Instead, publicists
' SAMANTHA BARBAS, MOVIE CRAZY: FANS, STARS, AND THE CULT OF CELEBRITY 165 (2001).
80 Louella Parsons, They're Human, Too, PHOTOPLAY, Aug. 1946, at 33.
'8 E.J. Kahn, The Slaves of Sinatra, NEW YORKER, Nov. 1946.
182See BARBAS, supra note 179, at 181. Fame not only had a destabilizing impact on social
relations, but it also had the potential to disrupt the psychological well-being of the newly famous. In
an influential essay published in 1947, Tennessee Williams crystallized the popular view of fame's
impact on the individual. Tennessee Williams, On a Streetcar Named Success, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1947, at X1. Williams described his own "spiritual dislocation" upon the widespread success of his
play The Glass Menagerie. Id. Quoting from William James, he referred to the success enjoyed by
celebrities as a "Bitch Goddess" that results in alienation and distrust. Id. Striving and hard work need
to be part of an artist's existence, yet the life of a celebrity does not even require a certain minimal
effort as the individual no longer has to perform a single menial task. Id. Williams' take on celebrity
was often repeated in popular entertainment and social commentary: for example, films like A Face in
the Crowd and A Star is Born depicted celebrities as people from common origins who are corrupted by
fame. MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 90-91. Christopher Lasch's 1979 book The Culture of
Narcissism blamed everything from the Vietnam War to a decline in "team spirit" on the psychological
pathologies of being a celebrity. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARcISSISM 116-19, 209-11
(1979).
183 See TYE, supra note 170, at 157. The most famous celebrity publicists of the day, Harry
Reichenbach and Jim Moran, were known for outrageous stunts that captured media attention yet
bespoke a lack of professionalism. Denise E. DeLorme & Fred Fedler, Early Journalists and the
Evolution of Publicists' Stunts: From Circus Ballyhoo to Professionalism, 2 J. INTERDISC. &
MULTIDISCIPLINARY RES. 1, 5-6 (2008).
18 TYE, supra note 170, at 81.
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were viewed as "flim flam" men.' 85  Even if their techniques sometimes
worked, they were looked down upon.'86 Originally used to refer to
carnival barkers, the term "ballyhoo" became synonymous with early
twentieth-century publicists and press agents, suggesting an unsavory
character to their brand of visibility building.
87
Legal opinion regarding public relations matched the general
skepticism of the times. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter
described public relations experts as "professional poisoners of the public
mind" who exploit "foolishness and fanaticism and self-interest.' ' 88 Judge
Learned Hand bemoaned modern American society's reliance on media
specialists describing "publicity [as] an evil substitute" for "first-hand
knowledge."' 8 9 Other judicial opinions suggested a lack of respect for the
practitioners of "ballyhoo."' 90 Legal commentators feared what they
viewed as a new era of focus on image and surface, describing "the
domination of the electoral process by professional public-relations
firms" 9' and placing quotation marks around the term "professional" when
describing public relations analysts. 92 Unlike other elites that judges and
legal academics could identify with, publicists seemed to rely on
185 See, e.g., Stanley Walker, Playing the Deep Bassoons, HARPERS MAG., Feb. 1932, at 373;
TYE, supra note 170, at 63 (stating that despite triumphs, publicists' roles were still cast in a "dimmer
light" causing people to raise doubts about the profession).
186 See TURNER, supra note 112, at 43 (describing the popular view of press agents as "an
unsavory and forlorn group of men"). But see NEAL GABLER, WlNCHELL: GOSSIP, POWER AND THE
CULTURE OF CELEBRITY 249 (1995) (stating that, despite press agents being widely despised, they were
"the ants that moved the mountain" because without them, there would be no mass culture).
187 See, e.g., SAMANTHA BARBAS, THE FIRST LADY OF HOLLYWOOD: A BIOGRAPHY OF LOUELLA
PARSONS 194 (2005) (describing articles in the popular press that "attacked the studios for misleading
audiences with publicity 'ballyhoo'); John Lentz, Publicity-How to Plan, Produce, and Place It, 33
AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 449, 449 (1943) (book review) (stating that publicity is synonymous with
ballyhoo). One example important to the public mind at the time was the outrageous publicization of
screen idol Rudolph Valentino's funeral. See REIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 284. Publicist Harry C.
Klemfuss organized a "dramatic and [slightly] macabre staging" of Valentino's interment complete
with blackshirted honor guard and actors hired to look like genuine mourners that screamed bad taste
yet drew enormous crowds. Id. at 284; JERRE MANGIONE & BEN MORREALE, LA STORIA: FIVE
CENTURIES OF THE ITALIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 387 (1993). The publicity worked too well in
some eyes as onlookers rioted at the funeral home, smashing windows and injuring several.
FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE 1920s 212 (1931); see
also M.M. Marberry, The Overloved One, 16 AM. HERITAGE MAG. 84 (1965), available at
http://www.americanheritage.com/content/*/oE2%80%9C-overloved-oneE2%80%9D (describing the
publicity surrounding Valentino's funeral and the public's immense interest in it).
'88 TYE, supra note 170, at 63 (quoting letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to President Franklin
D. Roosevelt (May 7, 1934)).
189 Proceedings in Memory of Justice Brandeis, 317 U.S. ix, xiv-xv (1942).
'90 E.g., Greenberg v. Lorenz, 178 N.Y.S.2d 407, 409 (App. Term 1958).
191 Murray L. Schwartz, Packer: The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1277,
1291 (1968) (book review).
192 H.H. Wilson, Book Note, 64 YALE L.J. 617, 619 (1955) (reviewing ROBERT E. LANE, THE
REGULATION OF BUSINESSMEN: SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC CONTROL (1954)).
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obfuscation and lacked a method of licensure or ethical code to regulate
their profession. 1
93
B. Public Relations Rationalizes Fame
Later in the twentieth century, however, the public relations industry
evolved in ways that conferred legitimacy on its practices. By introducing
supposedly scientific methods for measuring popularity, the profession
helped ease fears over the unpredictable nature of fame. 194 As businesses
came to believe that the selling power of celebrity could be managed and
controlled, they invested more resources in celebrity advertising and
merchandise. By the 1980s and 1990s, earlier hostility to the
psychological underpinnings of celebrity was replaced with a newfound
respect for efforts to achieve public recognition. Through a concerted
effort to demonstrate its ability to systematize the creation of celebrity, the
public relations profession helped assuage longstanding fears over fame's
mercurial nature. In this way, the technological changes described in Part
II were an important precondition to the expansion of celebrity rights, but
the efforts of publicity practitioners seizing on those changes were also
critical to the growth of the right of publicity.195
Public relations, particularly with regard to celebrities, only achieved
legitimacy in the last decades of the twentieth century when publicists
unveiled two new strategies for crafting public opinion. 196  The first,
segmenting, successfully diffused celebrity power to make it seem less
threatening while at the same time providing publicists with a skill they
could claim as their own. Originally, what made the crowd theorists so
threatened by celebrity was its link to the undifferentiated mob. 19 7 Early
use of celebrities in endorsement deals did nothing to assuage this threat as
193 Fledgling efforts were made to mark public relations as a respectable profession with its own
methodology and code of ethics in the 1940s, but they failed to achieve widespread support. See
RICHARD S. TEDLOW, KEEPING THE CORPORATE IMAGE: PUBLIC RELATIONS AND BUSINESS, 1900-
1950 39-40 (1979). A formal professional organization, the Public Relations Society of America
(PRSA) was formed in 1948 and developed an industry code of ethics six years later. MARVIN N.
OLASKY, CORPORATE PUBLIC RELATIONS: ANEw HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 127 (1987). The success
of the PRSA's code is debatable, however, as ethical concerns were not even discussed in any of the
public relations textbooks of the time. See T.H. Bivins, Are Public Relations Texts Covering Ethics
Adequately?, 4 J. MASS MEDIA, 39, 41-43 (1989) (discussing how little text space is devoted to ethics
in public relations textbooks).
194 See, e.g., REIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 104-05 (discussing how ratings under the Q Score
system were developed to quantify celebrities' drawing power).
195 See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 13, at 929 (describing how legally significant social
movements often take advantage of technological changes to justify new legal claims).
196 See DAVID MILLER & WILLIAM DINAN, A CENTURY OF SPIN: How PUBLIC RELATIONS
BECAME THE CU1rTING EDGE OF CORPORATE POWER 4 (2008) (contending that public relations only
began to become systematized in the later twentieth century as its general use in the business world
greatly expanded).
'9' See MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 27-28.
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such deals featured stars that could captivate the entire public. This fit
with a general strategy in early twentieth century advertising to appeal to
the public on the broadest terms possible.198 The biographer of publicist
Edward Bernays wrote that Bernays "was wary of the common man,
especially when he got together with other common men."'199
Nevertheless, Bernays' campaigns were typically designed for mass
appeal, not narrow demographics.200
Beginning after World War II, however, public relations professionals
identified particular demographic groupings that their celebrities could
appeal to.20 ! In part, this stemmed from broader changes taking place in
American society. Marketers took note as groups organized by race,
ethnicity, and gender banded together to fight for political and civil
rights.20 2 Technological advances generated fine-grained data on consumer
preferences while allowing for more targeted commercial solicitations.20 3
Meanwhile, in the 1980s and 1990s, the number of communications
channels available for consumption multiplied greatly, which permitted the
development of celebrities designed to appeal to narrower and narrower
demographic slices.2°4 As a result, rather than discovering talent, the
primary role of the celebrity public relations specialist in the second half of
the twentieth century was to discover a market and then insert the
appropriate celebrity into that market.205  For example, by the 1980s,
efforts at celebrity creation in the music industry revolved around
identifying a particular market segment and stylistically differentiating the
206artist-client to appeal to that segment. Advertisers now soughtcelebrities that could project images suitable for the interests and lifestyle
198 See JOSEPH TUROW, NICHE ENVY: MARKETING DISCRIMINATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 30-31
(2006); Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and Social Identity, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 931,945-46 (2010).
'99 TYE, supra note 170, at 97.200 id.
201 GAMSON, supra note 75, at 13 (stating that marketing became more scientific with the trend of
targeting specific market niches in product development and sales).
202 ALEXANDRA CHASIN, SELLING OUT: THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT GOES TO MARKET,
at xv (2000); see also LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 161, 309-10 (2003) (tracing the rise of use of "market
segmentation" by retailers to the 1960s and 1970s).
203 See TUROW, supra note 198, at 2; see also CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE
NATURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE 5-6 (2006) (discussing how the Internet has caused
the cost of reaching niche consumers to fall); SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS, ALL THE RAGE: THE
STORY OF GAY VISIBILITY IN AMERICA 236-37 (2001) ("[N]iche marketing has itself become the
preeminent strategy of both corporations and the media.").
24 See MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 186 (discussing differentiated production of celebrities
within particular aspects of the entertainment industry).
205 See GAMSON, supra note 75, at 15 ("[A] shrewd agent was shown discovering a market and
manufacturing a celebrity-product around it.").
206 MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 161.
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of a specific social niche.2 °7 Marketers began to see the untapped
economic potential of using particular celebrities to appeal to racial
minority groups. 20 8 This specialization process not only made the publicity
agents' expertise appear more necessary and more systematic, but it also
helped ameliorate concerns with the unpredictability of figures that drew
their support from the general population. A celebrity who appealed to a
narrow demographic was less threatening than one who captivated the
entire country.
Another critical innovation in celebrity public relations was the
quantification of fame. Just as early advertisers attempted to gain
professional status by linking marketing methods to scientific principles,
publicists developed ratings systems to quantify the selling power of
celebrities.20 9  The first of these systems focused on particular attributes
thought to be relevant to consumer response to endorsements. In 1953,
psychologist Carl Hovland introduced a model for evaluating the
effectiveness of a persuasive message known as the Source Credibility
Model.210 Although originally developed for the study of communication,
advertisers used Hovland's model to measure the effectiveness of celebrity
endorsements.21  Other research demonstrated that consumers form
positive stereotypes about attractive people so additional models were
constructed to assess endorser attractiveness.2 2 Advertisers became
increasingly eager to select particularly good-looking media personalities
for their commercials.213 These new techniques offered "proof' as to
which personalities would have commercial appeal.
In addition to introducing systematized predictions of credibility and
attractiveness, publicists began to offer advertisers more refined data on
celebrity popularity. Beginning in the 1960s, a United States firm known
as Marketing Evaluations began sending out questionnaires to the public to
207 See Alan R. Miciak & William L. Shanklin, Choosing Celebrity Endorsers, 3 MKTG. MGMT.
51, 55 (1994) ("Celebrities who are deemed to be desirable by agencies and clients project images that
coalesce with the interests, experiences, and lifestyles of the target market.").
208 CASHMORE, supra note 4, at 118-19.
209 See REIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 119.
210 See CARL I. HOVLAND ET AL., COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES
OF OPINION CHANGE 21, 38-39 (1953) (investigating the effect that credibility of a source has on
marketing success); see also B. Zafer Erdogan, Celebrity Endorsement: A Literature Review, 15 J.
MKTG. MGMT. 291, 297 (1999) (stating that the Source Credibility Model reflects the theory that
"various characteristics of a perceived communication source may have a beneficial effect on message
receptivity").
211 See Erdogan, supra note 210, at 297 (discussing the findings of Hovland's study as indication
that the "effectiveness of a message depends on [the] perceived level of expertise and trustworthiness
of an endorser").
212 See Lynn R. Kahle & Pamela M. Homer, Physical Attractiveness of the Celebrity Endorser: A
Social Adaptation Perspective, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 954-55 (1985) (concluding that studies show a
positive correlation between the attractiveness of an informational source and attitudinal change).
213 Erdogan, supra note 210, at 299.
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sample their knowledge and favorability rating for various well-known
figures.214 Marketing Evaluations used these survey responses to calculate
a number, known as a "Q score," that represents an individual celebrity's
relative popularity, and hence, potential as a corporate spokesperson. The
figure's Q score is "calculated by dividing the percentage of the total
survey sample rating the celebrity as 'one of their favourites"' by the
percentage of the sample who acknowledge knowing the celebrity.215
Marketing Evaluations also provides advertisers with "Dead Qs"-ratings
of the current popularity of dead celebrities.216 These ratings tend to show
that celebrity likeability increases after death, making some dead
celebrities even more marketable than their living counterparts.
217
Over time, Q ratings achieved greater and greater legitimacy. The
media and the general public came to rely on them to describe events in the
entertainment industry. Press accounts frequently cite the rise or fall of a
celebrity's Q-score as concrete evidence of changes in public approval.218
For example, a 1987 profile of the actress Cher explained "[t]here is no
clear evidence that Cher has pull" given her low Q ratings.21 9 On the other
hand, Whoopi Goldberg's ability to land starring roles in films during the
late 1980s and early 1990s was attributed to her high Q ratings.22° In 1993,
famed 60 Minutes producer Don Hewitt complained about television
journalism's increasing reliance on such statistics.221  Today, celebrity
gossip columnists use the ratings to explain why it no longer makes sense
for Hollywood directors to cast troubled starlet Lindsay Lohan222 and how
214 Id. at 302; see also PETER B. ORLIK, CAREER PERSPECTIVES IN ELECTRONIC MEDIA 23 (2004)
("[T]he Q ratings annually survey some ten thousand households as to their attitudes towards
approximately fifteen hundred performers and celebrities in twenty-one categories.").
215 Erdogan, supra note 210, at 302.
216 Q score: Definition, WORD IQ, http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Q._score (last visited Sept.
16,2011).
217 See Aaron Baar, Q Score: Celebs Worth More Dead Than Alive, MEDIAPOST (July 9, 2009,
3:44 PM), http://mediapost.com/publications/index.cfn?fa=Articles.showArticle&art-aid=109467
(predicting an increase in Michael Jackson's likability following his death based on the increased
popularity of both Johnny Cash and Elvis Presley in the aftermath of their deaths).
218 E.g., Beth Landman Keil & Deborah Mitchell, Is Ellen Out of Favor?, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 22,
1997, at 11 (evaluating Ellen DeGeneres's negative Q rating); Eric Wilson, Who's That Girl?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2008, at G1 (discussing Madonna's declining Q score); Catharine P. Taylor, Leno's Q
Score Takes It on Chin, But How Bad Is the Injury?, BNET (Mar 18, 2010),
http://www.bnet.com/blog/new-media/lenos-q-score-takes-it-on-chin-but-how-bad-is-the-injury/5028?
tag-mantle_skin;content (discussing the decline in Jay Leno's Q score in just a few months).
219 Bruce Weber, Cher's Next Act, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1987, at 42.
220 Steve Bomfeld, WHO's Q, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Apr. 19,1992, at G1.
221 Nicholas Fraser, Media: Greying Eminence, GUARDIAN, Nov. 15, 1993, at 16.
222 E.g., Nicole Eggenberger, Why Is Lindsay Lohan a Bad Business Investment?, OK! MAG.
(Apr. 26, 2010, 3:35 PM), http://www.okmagazine.com/2010/04/why-is-lindsay-lohan-a-bad-business-
investment/ ("[F]or every nine people who will see a Lindsay movie, 52 out of 100 will not.").
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Britney Spears' bizarre behavior "may be eroding her own brand. 223
When evidence of Tiger Woods' infidelity came to light, media outlets
quickly cited his declining Q-score as proof of his fall from grace.224 There
appears to be little concern with the difficulty in measuring something as
irrational as public attraction to a celebrity. As one popular celebrity
gossip blogger recently opined, "[1]ikability may seem difficult to quantify,
but it's actually pretty simple. 225
Perhaps most telling, in a commercial landscape where one-quarter of
all advertisements rely on celebrity endorsers, 226 the Q-score system has
become the "industry standard in advertising." 227  In 1989, network
executives engaged in a bidding war to lure news anchor Connie Chung
because of her high Q rating.228 When Mickey Mantle died in 1995, media
watchers speculated as to what his Q-score would mean for his postmortem
marketability. 229 Business school textbooks describe the Q rating system
as a valuable marketing tool.230 In recent years, other firms have followed
Marketing Evaluations' lead, introducing their own celebrity rating
systems with subtle tweaks on the Q score model.23'
These techniques-segmenting and quantification-increased the
223 Jeremy Herron, An Economy Grows AroundBritney Spears, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2008,
9:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/01/28/an-economy-grows-around-b n 83673.html.
224 E.g., Michael O'Keeffe, Q School to Target Tiger, Ad Image in Question, N.Y. DAILY NEws,
Dec. 4, 2009, at 72 (noting the expected decrease in Woods' Q Score in the wake of his scandal).
225 Jo Piazza, Hollywood Investments: Why Lindsay Lohan Is So Unbankable, PoPEATER (Apr.
26, 2010, 12:52 PM), http://www.popeater.com/2010/04/26/lindsay-lohan-box-office.
226 Erdogan, supra note 210, at 292.
227 Kevin E. Kahle & Lynn R. Kahle, Sports Celebrities' Image: A Critical Evaluation of the
Utility of Q Scores, in CREATING IMAGES AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MARKETING COMMUNICATION
191, 192 (Lynn R. Kahle & Chung-Hy6n Kim eds., 2006); see also BERNARD J. MULLIN ET AL., SPORT
MARKETING 154 (3d ed. 2007) ('"[Hundreds of millions of advertising decisions are predicated' on
the annual Q-Score ...."); Miciak & Shanklin, supra note 207, at 53 ("Advertisers often consult the
Performer Q score to estimate a celebrity's endorsement potential."); John Marchese, There's Gold in
This Old Tool Belt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997, at Cl ("A 'Q score' is a quotient of on-screen likability
that advertisers crave.").
228 Bill Carter, Television: One Queen, Two Thrones: The Fight for Connie Chung, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1989, at Dl.
229 Richard Sandomir, Amid Memories and Profit, Mantle's Legend Lives On, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 1996, at Al.
230 See ORLIK, supra note 214, at 23, 25 ("The Q ratings do constitute an important tool by which
advertising agencies can zero in on spokespersons who appear to test well on name recognition and
familiarity with the demographic group(s) that clients are attempting to reach."); JOHN R. ROSSITER &
LARY PERCY, ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION MANAGEMENT 293-94 (1987) (describing the VisCAP
model, which is functionally analogous to the Q-Score, as an important marking tool for choosing a
celebrity endorser); TERENCE A. SHIMP, ADVERTISING, PROMOTION, AND SUPPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF
INTEGRATED MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS (4th ed. 1997) ("Performer Q-Ratings provide valuable
information to brand managers and advertising agencies ... ").
231 See DUANE E. KNAPP, THE BRAND PROMISE 188-91 (2008) (describing the Davie-Brown
index (DBI), developed by Davie-Brown Entertainment and based on the individual attributes of
celebrities and a combination of other variables).
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power of celebrities and the publicists who shepherded them through the
media. By purporting to know just how to target and quantify a celebrity's
popularity, publicists laid claim to specialized skills that others wanted in
an era of increasing celebrity value. Originally considered socially inferior
to journalists,232 publicists began to become bigger and bigger participants
in the news cycle. Journalists in the 1980s and 1990s became dependent
on publicists for content, ceding status and power to them in return for
compelling narratives.233  By one account, seventy percent of all
information published as "news" in the 1990s was provided by a public
relations agent.234 At the same time, public relations management
expanded into new fields besides entertainment, giving it further social
legitimacy.235 For businesses, it became more and more acceptable to
transparently acknowledge their efforts at image creation and branding.236
Publicists also found new professional power through sheer numbers. By
the 1980s, there were 100,000 public relations professionals practicing in
the United States.237 Certain celebrity agents, like Michael Ovitz and Scott
Boras, rose to the status of celebrities themselves.238
The legal importance of these changes in how celebrity publicity is
presented and perceived should not be underestimated. The move to
quantify fame assuaged particular legal concerns over the amorphous
nature of celebrity. Rights that are deemed to be vague are not treated as
fully alienable and inheritable under the law.239 Although a right of
publicity has existed since 1953, a typical objection to a descendible right
of publicity was that the interests at stake were so unspecific that they
should not be deemed "property.,' 240 But once the value of celebrity
appeared susceptible to rigorous measurement, these concerns dissipated.
Measures to quantify celebrity marketability became accepted as valuable
232 See REIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 284 ("Many publicists were ex-newspaper
writers.... News reporters have long disdained turncoats who found it expedient to sell their souls to
the devil and flood their former newsrooms with promotional material.").
233 See GAMSON, supra note 75, at 42 (noting that news has become more dependent on public
relations practitioners); see also Frances Bonner, The Celebrity in the Text, in UNDERSTANDING
MEDIA: INSIDE CELEBRITY, supra note 173, at 57,92 (noting the increased presence of celebrities in the
news); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 28 (1997) (explaining how the news has
become more dependent on celebrity).
234 REIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 286.
235 Id. at 272, 285.
236 See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA 183-94
(Vintage Books 1992) (1961).
237 GAMSON, supra note 75, at 42; see also TYE, supra note 170, at x (noting that there were
125,000 public relations practitioners by the end of the twentieth century).
238 See TURNER, supra note 112, at 44; Jack Curry, Ultimate Salesman, Pitching the Biggest Stars
in Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at D1.
239 Terrell & Smith, supra note 92, at 6.
240 id.
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evidence in legal proceedings.241 Courts now admit expert witness
testimony to place a dollar figure on celebrity.242 In the civil trial of O.J.
Simpson, the head of a celebrity licensing agency valued Simpson's
publicity rights at twenty-five million dollars.243 Valuation of celebrity
seems to give modem courts little pause.244  The perceived increase in
celebrity status during a marriage now qualifies, at least in some states, as
marital property subject to equitable distribution on divorce. 245  Even
"Dead Q" scores are touted as admissible evidence that can be used by
celebrity estates in infringement lawsuits.246  The quantification of
celebrity's value made the case for property rights in celebrity personas
more compelling. By crystallizing a star's endorsement value, marketers
offered real evidence to lawmakers of the value in celebrity rights.
Courts also began to analogize celebrities with trademarks during this
period. One aim of trademark law is to stabilize meanings, and thereby
reduce the search costs of consumers.24' Bankable stars, rather than
representing unpredictable forces that can endanger careful economic
planning, have come to serve as symbols that reify corporate identities and
241 E.g., Ryther v. KARE 11, 864 F. Supp. 1510, 1515 (D. Minn. 1994), aff'd, 108 F.3d 832 (8th
Cir.) ("The Q score is widely used in the media industry to show viewer attachment to a personality by
measuring the percentage of viewers who recognize the person and the percentage of viewers who are
strongly favorable or strongly unfavorable of that person. The information obtained from open-ended
questions provides a more complete picture of what viewers think about key personalities."); see also
Valuations, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/valuations (last visited Sept. 12, 2011)
("The most critical component to Right of Publicity licensing or litigation disputes is that of
valuations.").
242 See Jonathan Faber, Protecting, Valuing and Licensing the Famous, IND. LAW., Mar. 24-Apr.
6, 2004, at 1 ("Expert witnesses for valuation purposes often perform an integral role in providing an
objective, substantiated market value assessment or damages evaluation."); see also, e.g., Callaway
Golf Co. v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., No. 07CV0373-LAB, 2009 WL 5125603, at *1, *3 (S.D. Cal.
Dec. 18, 2009) (denying motion to exclude expert witness testimony regarding "the value of television
advertising and other services performed by athletes"); Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 68, 70 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2006) (allowing expert testimony regarding endorsement value of name of former NHL
hockey player).
243 Rufo v. Simpson, 86 Cal. App. 4th 573, 617-18 (2001); B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Set Damages
That Hurt Simpson, Jury Is Urged, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at A20.
244 See Westfall & Landau, supra note 10, at 104 (maintaining that "a thriving market exists for
publicity rights" that makes their value easily estimated).
245 See Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040, 1042 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (finding that
the plaintiff's celebrity goodwill achieved during the marriage could be included in the marital estate);
Westfall & Landau, supra note 10, at 99-110 (describing the current state of the law regarding the
treatment of celebrity goodwill upon divorce).
246 Anna Heinemann, Lucille Ball Is the Best Dead Celeb for Your Ad Campaign, ADVER. AGE
(July 18, 2005), http://adage.com/article/mediaworks/lucille-ball-dead-celeb-ad-campaign/46265/.
247 Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Polaroid
Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)); Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta,
and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 336-37
(2006).
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take the risk out of media production. 248  One powerful example of how
judges accepted the newfound economic potential of celebrity was their
choice to describe celebrities as "brands" or "trademarks," invoking the
same terms used by celebrity publicists and marketers. 249 Hence in a 1992
case featuring singer Tom Waits, the court explained that false
endorsement law extends to celebrities who have "an economic interest
akin to that of a trademark holder in controlling the commercial
exploitation of his or her identity." 250 In another case, the court noted that
"courts routinely recognize a property right in celebrity identity akin to that
of a trademark holder."251 The Ninth Circuit adapted its traditional test for
trademark infringement to accommodate celebrity false endorsement
claims, explaining that, for celebrity cases, "the term 'mark' applies to the
celebrity's persona, the 'strength' of the mark refers to the level of
recognition that the celebrity has among the segment of the public to whom
the advertisement is directed, and the term 'goods' concerns the reasons for
or source of the celebrity's fame. '252 These cases explain that the right of
celebrities to control use of their names and likenesses parallels the
privileges held by trademark owners.25 3  By borrowing from the
terminology of trademark law, judges signal their acceptance of celebrity
as a stabilizing and predictable force.254
248 David Hesmondhalgh, Producing Celebrity, in UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: INSIDE CELEBRITY,
supra note 173, at 98, 116; see also MARSHALL, supra note 156, at 245 (stating that celebrities are
meant to serve as imperfect economic stabilizing devices like brand names). Like their judicial
counterparts, today's legal academics often cede the rationality of celebrity value. Roberta Kwall
accepts the influence of celebrity on buying decisions, noting that "celebrity endorsements function in
much the same way as trademarks do-to communicate information about the product." Kwall, supra
note 233, at 25. Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, although arguing for imposing strict limits on the
right of publicity akin to trademark law, maintain that celebrity endorsements play such a significant
role in today's consumer society that consumers' psychological predisposition towards celebrity should
be legally preserved. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1164 n.10 ("In a market economy, the right of
publicity quite reasonably takes this consumer preference as a given and tries to make sure that even if
consumers are irrational in preferring celebrity-endorsed products, they are at least not deceived as to
the endorsement of those products."). Sheldon Halpem contends that "the kinship between the federal
trademark construct and [the right of publicity] is evident" and that the value in celebrity "is simply a
matter of market place reality." Sheldon Halpern, Trafficking in Trademarks: Setting Boundaries for
the Uneasy Relationship Between "Property Rights" and Trademark and Publicity Rights, 58 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1013, 1033, 1035 (2009). Although often hostile to some aspects of the right of publicity, legal
scholars have accepted celebrity's recent repackaging as a quantifiable and predictable component of
business.
249 In recent years, a host of decisions have recognized celebrity claims for false endorsement
under the Lanham Act, the federal statute goveming trademark law. Beser, supra note 89, at 1804.
250 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992).
251 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003).
252 Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
253 See David S. Welkowitz, Famous Marks Under the TDRA, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 983, 983
(2009) (noting increasing use of "celebrity trademarks" in the late twentieth century).
254 One response to the analogy drawn between celebrity rights and trademark rights would be to
question the necessity of the right of publicity at all given the presence of a trademark regime that
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Celebrity's rationalization coincided with deeper affinities between
celebrities and legal and political elites.255 Judges are now more accepting
of the role of publicists, even protecting celebrity communications with
public relations firms under the attorney-client privilege.256 Recognizing
that the requirements for celebrity have dropped and that segmenting
allows for stardom in narrow fields, lawyers have set out to find their own
fame. Publishers print legal "halls of fame," marking lawyers and judges
with the badge of celebrity. 257  Lawyers have their own gossip blogs to
keep up on the comings and goings of the legally well-known.258 Several
television shows specialize in chronicling the legal troubles of celebrities,
and heavily feature their legal counsel. 259 News channels devote hours to
legal questions and catapult lawyers-cum-news anchors to celebrity
status.260  "[T]he best-known lawyers among us are show business icons,
luminaries in the culture of celebrity., 2 61  Meanwhile, judges show an
increased willingness to invoke the lessons of popular culture in real-life
legal decisions.262
In addition, celebrity influence on political elites has also increased.
Celebrity involvement with politics is nothing new, but Linda Demaine has
protected celebrity personas. Although it does not appear that any court or legislature has
acknowledged this argument, it has attracted academic attention. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 2,
at 1166. But see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 2:8 (criticizing Dogan and Lemley's approach for not
recognizing the need for publicity rights in situations where a celebrity persona is being used without
permission but there is no implied endorsement by the celebrity).
255 A wall once existed between movie and sports stars and other elites. Madow, supra note 2, at
226; see also Evans, supra note 172, at 16 (noting that theorists have noticed the erosion of boundaries
between all forms of celebrity and high society). For example, serious artists used to see themselves as
removed from majority culture. In recent decades, however, this tension has been successfully
negotiated by celebrities. One can be both famous and a revered artist. See SCHICKEL, supra note 141,
at 239 (noting that Andy Warhol capitalized on his celebrity through his work). Meanwhile, artists and
writers use the same publicity techniques as movie stars, sometimes working to make themselves into
public figures before generating any significant corpus of artistic work. REIN ET AL., supra note 122, at
87.
2561n re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (during the criminal
prosecution of Martha Stewart, the court, responding to a discovery request for Stewart's public
relations firms, treated the public relations firms as consultants and compared their role to that of non-
testifying experts or jury consultants who may enjoy attomey-client privilege).
257 See, e.g., Law Hall of Fame, DUHAIME.ORG, http://www.duhaime.org/LawMuseum/
LawArticle-46/The-Laws-Hall-of-Fame.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2011); Law Job Star,
LAWCROSSING, http://www.lawcrossing.com/article/lcarticlearchive.php?type=92# (last visited Sept.
16, 2011).
25 8 
E.g., ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011); ROLLONFRIDAY,
http://www.rollonfriday.com/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2011); see also Leigh Jones, Gossip Blogs Bedevil
Law Firms, NAT'L L.J., June 2, 2008, at 1, 10.
259 Robert W. Wood, When High Priced Lawyers Are Tax Deductible, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N. J.,
Feb. 2007, at 11.
260 ROBIN D. BARNES, OUTRAGEOUS INVASIONS 178-79 (2010); Wood, supra note 259, at 11.
261 Richard K. Sherwin, Celebrity Lawyers and the Cult of Personality, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
517, 518 (2003).
262 Id. at 522.
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shown that a new era of celebrity involvement in the lawmaking process
began in the Reagan era.263 Not only did celebrities in that period
increasingly transition to careers in politics, but in the 1980s celebrities
also began to regularly testify before legislative committees.2 4 She argues
that modem politicians accept celebrities as having a salutary role in
policymaking, something their predecessors would not have agreed with.265
Celebrities are now advised to inject themselves into the political discourse
as a career move. 266 At the same time, politicians have come to adopt the
same publicity strategies as movie stars and athletes, employing more
personal narratives in appeals to voters and giving greater attention to the
construction of images.267 In turn, the modem news media further
celebritizes politicians, spending the bulk of its investigative resources on
private aspects that arguably have little to do with a politician's official
role.268 The recent breakdown of boundaries between celebrities and
political elites offers one explanation for the rapid manner in which
celebrities captured special legal rewards for their status during the 1980s.
Rather than worrying about the psychological effects of fame, political
leaders, lawyers, and judges participate in the same publicity exercises as
the famous and provide specialized privileges to encourage fame's
269pursuit.
263 Linda J. Demaine, Navigating Policy by the Stars: The Influence of Celebrity Entertainers on
Federal Lawmaking, 25 J.L. & POL. 83, 86, 135 (2009).
264 Id. at 87-88
265 Id. at 90-91, 132; see also TURNER, supra note 112, at 133 (describing the increasing role of
celebrities in politics).
266 MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 110; Demaine, supra note 263, at 94.
267 Evans, supra note 172, at 45; see also MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 19 (noting that the
division between politicians and celebrities has blurred because of a "convergence in [their] source of
power"); TURNER, supra note 112, at 132 (noting that political strategies are being derived "from the
celebrity industry's methods for building the public identity of the celebrity-commodity").
268 See Bonner, supra note 233, at 92 (noting how political stories have become infused with a
"human interest" element); John Comer, Mediated Persona and Political Culture, in MEDIA AND THE
RESTYLING OF POLITICS: CONSUMERISM, CELEBRITY AND CYNICISM 67, 76-78 (John Comer & Dick
Pels eds., 2003) (discussing "journalistic surveillance" into politicians' "off-duty" lives).
269 MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 19 (discussing convergence of forms of power in modern
society as the line between political and entertainment elites diminished). The more your particular
group can be viewed as keeping company with other high status groups, the more status that is
conferred on your own group. Murray Milner Jr., Celebrity Culture as a Status System, HEDGEHOG
REV., Spring 2005, at 66, 69. Other recent legal initiatives provide particularized protections for
celebrities and reveal that, instead of emphasizing the corrupting nature of fame, lawmakers are
concerned with the special challenges celebrities face from other members of society. Some
commentators suggest that celebrities should have their own special courts suited to their particular
legal problems. Craig Matsuda, Courting the Stars: Why the Legal System Needs New(s) Thinking for
Overpowering Celebrity Trials, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1223, 1223 (2006). Anti-paparazzi laws have
been passed to protect celebrities from the outside world. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708 (West 2009).
Furthermore, perhaps most analogous to publicity rights, trademark rules have been altered to aid
celebrity plaintiffs. When the plaintiff is a celebrity, courts have relaxed the rules that typically apply
to trademark holders in false endorsement cases. Although the typical trademark plaintiff must prove
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V. MAKING CELEBRITY POLITICALLY PALATABLE
In the last years of the twentieth century, special protections for
celebrities suddenly became a safe political bet. As suggested above, part
of the answer can be found in the changing understandings of the economic
and psychological bases for celebrity, which were in turn fueled by
technological and social change. But as celebrity became more rational
and lucrative, it also became more democratic. Originally, celebrity status
was something that only applied to a rarified few. In the 1980s and 1990s,
however, the perceived relationship between the famous and their
audiences changed in ways that appeared more inclusive and, hence, made
special legislation benefitting celebrities more politically palatable.
Meanwhile, political coalitions developed that overwhelmed those interest
groups still opposed to celebrity rights. Celebrities, their heirs, and their
licensing agencies flexed their increasing economic and political muscle
and co-opted key rivals en route to convincing legislators to enact broader
and more long-lasting publicity rights.
A. From Elite to Ordinary
The social history of celebrity is intimately linked with changing
understandings of what it means to be famous. Rather than being a static
concept, fame has meant different things to different generations of
Americans. Lawmakers establishing the right of publicity in the 1950s and
1960s acted in the context of a particular view of what it meant to be
famous, and this view led to several restrictions on the right. Although
lawmakers understood the economic potential of celebrity, another concern
prevented them from embracing strong property rights in celebrity
personas. Instead of being something that anyone could potentially enjoy,
fame was reserved for a select group that had demonstrated great
achievement. As a result, the privileges afforded by the right of publicity
were fundamentally undemocratic. Not everyone could be great, not
everyone had equal access to the spotlight, and this caused reluctance in
awarding special legal protections to celebrities.
In time, however, this view of fame faded and celebrity became
democratized. Lawmakers in the 1980s and 1990s acted under a different
standing by demonstrating a public association between the mark at issue and the goods or services
offered, this requirement is waived for celebrities. Beser, supra note 89, at 1804-05; see also e.g.,
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that Rosa Parks' international
recognition gave her name a protected trademark interest). Similarly, a celebrity that has avoided the
public eye or fallen out of public favor can still prosecute a claim for trademark infringement even
though trademark law's abandonment doctrine typically blocks infringement suits from plaintiffs that
have not used their mark for a significant period of time. Beser, supra note 89, at 1808-10; see also
Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409, 411 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a celebrity
name can still be protected under the Lanham Act even if it has not been used for a long time).
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understanding of fame. The proliferation of celebrity, on television and
online, reduced the distance between a celebrity and her audience.
Marketers encouraged a more democratic view of celebrity because they
thought it would help their bottom line. As a result, celebrity came to be
viewed as a phenomenon available to all. People were celebrities not
because of their outside achievements or inner greatness, but because they
had somehow engineered enough media exposure to capture public
attention. Now lawmakers and judges could create special privileges for
famous actors and athletes and still believe that they were serving the
general public.
1. Earlier Views of Fame
Until the last part of the twentieth century, fame remained tied to some
form of greatness in the popular imagination. Discourses of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries spoke of rises to fame based on merit.270
During this period, "famous men and great men were pretty nearly the
same group.' '271 Fame went to those whose accomplishments placed them
ahead of the rest.2 72 Average citizens did not attempt to get on the radio or
the television because they believed that fame required accomplishment,
not just publicity.273
Although every celebrity needs an audience, fame in this period was
not believed to require popular ratification. In his description of early
accounts of Hollywood celebrities, Joshua Gamson writes that the
greatness necessary for stardom involved "virtue, genius, character, or skill
that did not depend on audience recognition., 274  In other words, the
greatness linked to fame relied on special qualities inherent to the celebrity
herself. The ability to win over the public was not a part of this greatness,
but rather a byproduct of it. The link between fame and inner greatness
made celebrity an elite phenomenon. Inner greatness was a precondition
for celebrity, and this greatness only resided in a select few.
Early narratives of fame represented an aristocratic sense of social
ordering. Studios in the first half of the twentieth century controlled the
publicity of their actors and actresses and tried to communicate a sense of
unapproachability. 275  Film stars from this era were described as
270 See GAMSON, supra note 75, at 6.
271 BOORSTIN, supra note 236, at xxvii.
272 See LEO BRAUDY, THE FRENZY OF RENOWN: FAME AND ITS HISTORY 506 (1986).
273 See CASHMORE, supra note 4, at 192 ("Fame, recognition, and distinction were usually
attendant on achieving something of value.").
274 GAMSON, supra note 75, at 7.
275 DANIEL HERWITZ, THE STAR AS ICON: CELEBRITY IN THE AGE OF MASS CONSUMPTION 15
(2008); see also Ben Brantley, Whatever Happened to Mystery?, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2010, at STI
(describing a 1920s publicity image of Greta Garbo's head grafted onto the body of sphinx).
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"royalty., 276  Studio publicity machines often concocted stories of origin
for their stars demonstrating noble ancestry.277  Movie star profiles
emphasized their god-like qualities. A 1935 Photoplay description of
actress Loretta Young pronounced her "one of the most ethereally beautiful
women in the world," claimed she was "born to be loved and cherished by
men," and concluded that "[i]n other ages, men would have fought for her
favor, gladiators would have ridden to death for her glove., 278 Even the
experience of sitting in a movie theatre encouraged a view of the stars as
"outsized and fantastic. 279 It was no accident that the theatres where they
appeared before American audiences were billed as "palaces. 28 °
Over time, the studios became less restrictive in how they defined the
greatness necessary for stardom. The aristocratic notion of celebrity was in
tension with a rapidly expanding consumer culture. Businesses needed
celebrities to act not as unapproachable icons but as consumptive
exemplars. Advertising and celebrity reinforced each other, training
consumers in the need for consumption and identifying sources of
authority for understanding how to consume. 281  As a result, instead of
being a byproduct of some sort of aristocratic greatness, fame became re-
described as the reward given to people who had a particular combination
of "talent" and "star quality., 282 Actors and actresses were portrayed as
having an inner charisma that made them deserving of celebrity, while still
possessing the same interests as the general public.283 Some publicists
began to emphasize the mundane, attempting to prove that the movie stars
engaged in the same leisure activities as the rest of us.
28 4
276E.g., JIB FOWLES, STARSTRUCK: CELEBRITY PERFORMERS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 17
(1992) (referring to her career in the 1920s, Gloria Swanson stated, "[i]n those days the public wanted
us to live like kings and queens. So we did-and why not?"); Carl Van Vechten, Hollywood Royalty,
VANITY FAIR, July 1927, at 38.
27 7 See ALEXANDER WALKER, STARDOM: THE HOLLYWOOD PHENOMENON 51-52 (1970)
(discussing how audiences were told that actress Theda Bara was an Egyptian-born daughter of a
French actress and an Italian sculptor, when in reality she was the daughter of a tailor from Cincinnati).278 Loretta Young Is: The Beauty Who Cannot Stay in Love, PHOTOPLAY, Sept. 1935.
279 FOWLES, supra note 276, at 34.
280 Charlotte Herzog, The Movie Palace and the Theatrical Sources of Its Architectural Style,
CINEMA J., Spring 1981, at 15, 15.
281 Just as repetition of a particular commercial message could produce an emotional link with the
consumer, the new communicative technologies of photography, radio, and motion pictures created
similar affective bonds through familiarity with a particular person's voice and image. See BRAUDY,
supra note 272, at 584 (discussing repetitive familiarization of audience with celebrity images);
Armstrong, supra note 3, at 457-61 (linking increasing use of images by early twentieth-century
advertisers with changing normative views of celebrity).
282 GAMSoN, supra note 75, at 6.
283 Id. at 7-8 (describing how the presentation of celebrities became more "mortal" during this
time period); cf HALPERN, supra note 106, at 150 (describing the demystification of movie stars over
course the of the twentieth century).
2M See GAMSON, supra note 75, at 7-8 (describing examples of magazines that portrayed
celebrities as living "quietly" in "sensible and sound" homes).
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Yet celebrity narratives of the mid-twentieth century, despite becoming
somewhat more inclusive, still emphasized celebrity's exclusive nature.
As media studies scholar Ellis Cashmore chronicles:
The 1950s and early 1960s defined a kind of golden age of
glamour. Hollywood stars, in particular, were parts of a
pantheon: like deities, they seemed to exist at a level above
that of other mortals. They lived lives of such opulence,
such splendor, such sublime beauty that they seemed
unapproachable.285
The qualities that the stars supposedly had that justified their stardom were
not qualities found in others. Publicists described celebrity childhoods in a
way that made it seem that the individual always possessed that
indescribable star quality.286  "Talent" represented a particular sort of
individual character that few people possessed. A study of self-help guides
on stardom from the era offers some difficult advice: There is "no recipe"
for stardom for "[w]hat matters is the gift. '287 The public could not confer
the greatness necessary to celebrity; it was innate.
Celebrity status was also presented as something that could not be
planned or strategized; instead one needed to be discovered.288 Hard work
might help someone rise to prominence, but it could not actually create the
qualities needed for fame.289 Instead, "[flame, based on an indefinable
internal quality of the self, was natural, almost predestined." 290 During this
period, stories of achieving celebrity typically involved discovery by some
third party that plucked the individual out of obscurity. But the
"discovery" was treated as inevitable, as relying exclusively on the new
celebrity's own unique talents, rather than the publicity skills of her
handlers.2 91  Explaining celebrity origins in this manner ensured that
publicity did not intrude on a narrative focused on individual merit. The
legend of Lana Turner being discovered sitting in a Hollywood soda shop,
and immediately placed into the movies, emphasized how the natural
285 CASHMORE, supra note 4, at 19; see also TURNER, supra note 112, at 120 (describing the
glamorous portrayal of celebrities in the 1950s that emphasized the distance between them and their
audience).286 See LEO LOWENTHAL, LITERATURE, POPULAR CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 124-25 (1961) ("A
man is an actor, a doctor, a dancer, an entrepreneur, and he always was .... [Children are] rubber
stamped with and for a certain function.").
287 GAMSON, supra note 75, at 8 (quoting EDGAR MORIN, THE STARS 51 (1960)).
288 See REIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 24 (explaining the shift from the idea of "discovering"
celebrities to a new "breeding model").
289 GAMSON, supra note 75, at 8.
290 id.
291 Id.; see also TURNER, supra note 112, at 96 (describing "discovery" of film stars as part of the
"legitimating myth of success").
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292qualities of the star made her stand out even amidst everyday activities.
No publicity machine or other efforts at visibility building were necessary
to make Lana Turner famous. The characteristics of the true star naturally
rose to the surface. Celebrity was still reserved for a chosen few, those
with the inner greatness that justified stardom.
2. Modern Understanding of Fame
By the 1980s, however, the understanding of fame as dependent on
achievement had changed. With a proliferation of media outlets,
particularly on the new phenomenon of cable television, more and more
celebrities were needed.293  Although narratives discussing a celebrity's
destiny or inner talents still existed, in large part, greatness became
decoupled from celebrity.294 In a prescient article, Barbara Goldsmith
showed in 1983 that talent and fame were no longer linked.295  Among
several examples, she cited the wife of auto-executive John DeLorean who
became famous in the 1980s merely because she had a husband who was
arrested for dealing cocaine.296 Other cultural observers concluded that
fame no longer waited for accomplishment.297 As evidence, they could
point to nascent artists that became overnight sensations in the 1980s
before even displaying their works.298 Rather than slowly building a
corpus of work and refining their technique on the way to stardom, painters
Jean-Michel Basquiat and Keith Haring catapulted to the top of the art
world in a few short years.299 The same became true of star athletes. One
might think that athletes would have to wait to become celebrities until
enough time had passed for them to demonstrate achievement on the field,
but modem athletes receive lucrative global endorsement deals without
292 GAMSON, supra note 75, at 8.
293 See HALPERN, supra note 106, at 114-15 (explaining that the rise of television talk shows
allowed more celebrities to be showcased); PINSKY & YOUNG, supra note 132, at 39 (suggesting that it
was the rise of television as well as the Internet that brought a new array of celebrities into mainstream
media).
294 See BRAUDY, supra note 272, at 6 (explaining that modem fame is motivated not by a desire
for recognition for worthy actions but from a desire to use visibility for self-fulfillment).
295 Barbara Goldsmith, The Meaning of Celebrity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1983, at 75; see also
HERWITZ, supra note 275, at 138 (discussing how expansion of media led to an "increasing need to
divorce [celebrities] from values of talent"); PINSKY & YOUNG, supra note 132, at 59 ("Celebrity has
become uncoupled from talent or performance; today, being famous seems like a game anyone can
play.").
296 Goldsmith, supra note 295, at 75.
297 See BOORSTN, supra note 236, at 57 ("The celebrity is a person who is known for his well-
knownness."); LASCH, supra note 182, at 121 (explaining that the rise in popularity of sports stars came
not necessarily from their on-field performance, but also from mass promotion and marketing); REIN ET
AL., supra note 122, at 14 (arguing that visibility was valuable in itself, in contrast to prior decades
where visibility only had value when linked to achievement).
298 REIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 157.
299 Cathleen McGuigan, New Art, New Money, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 10, 1985, at 20.
ever achieving a significant milestone in their sport.300  The celebrity
power of sports stars like Anna Kournikova and David Beckham bears
little relationship to their actual competitive skills. 30 1 In the last part of the
twentieth century, fame came to refer to achieving visibility at a particular
moment as opposed to doing something so impressive that the actor
became a part of history.
30 2
Under the new view of fame, skill at self presentation became more
crucial than any other ability. 30 3 Rather than inexorably becoming known
because of inner talents, the modem celebrity manages to muscle her way
into the media cycle regardless of any other inner abilities. Celebrities are
now judged not on their outside accomplishments, but on their capabilities
in the glare of the public spotlight.30 4 Madonna, the quintessential 1980s
celebrity, is usually described in terms of her gift for audience attraction,
not her innate talents as a songstress or actor.30 5 Madonna's career marked
a new era in celebrity making where the focus was on capturing audience
attention--even if that meant more and more revelation of supposedly
private details that had been kept out of view in the past.30 6 A new focus
on self-promotion replaced the old emphasis on discovery of individuals
with the inner resources for celebrity.
30 7
With fame no longer tethered to narratives of inner greatness and
outside accomplishment, the 1980s ushered in a new sense that anyone
could become a celebrity, not just the talented.30 8  Modem celebrity
narratives reflect this demystification of the famous. The unapproachable
movie stars of early film have been replaced with accessible everymans
300 See CASHMORE, supra note 4, at 241 (describing the early stardom of LeBron James and
Michelle Wie); SEGRAVE, supra note 99, at 142 (discussing the thirty-one million dollar endorsement
deal Tiger Woods inked with Nike before he even began his professional career).
301 TURNER, supra note 112, at 19; see also Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and
Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 259 (2005) (using Anna Koumikova as an
example of the reality that many commercially marketable athletes are not at the top of their sport).
302 BRAUDY, supra note 272, at 539; see also TURNER, supra note 112, at 63 (describing the
modem approach to celebrity as an objective, rather than a result, of personal activity).
303 REIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 14; see also PINSKY & YOUNG, supra note 132, at 146 ("The
idea of fame as a reward for merit has been replaced by a belief that just getting noticed is enough.");
REIN ET AL., supra note 122, at 24, 61 (maintaining that American society has moved from a
"discovery model" of celebrity to a "breeding model" and explaining, "most aspirants [to celebrity]
achieve high visibility not as a result of irrepressible talent or accident, but rather because of a strategic
marketing process").
304 BRAUDY, supra note 272, at 573.
305 See CASHMORE, supra note 4, at 7; GLEN JEANSOME, A TIME OF PARADOX: AMERICA SINCE
1890 443-44 (2006).
306 CASHMORE, supra note 4, at 43, 49.
307 One prominent media critic described the new view of how to become famous as "if you never
shut up, no one can forget you." Brantley, supra note 275, at STI.
308 Andy Warhol famously articulated this decoupling of fame and achievement fifteen years
earlier by claiming that "[i]n the future everyone will be world famous for fifteen minutes." THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 803 (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th ed. 1999).
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and everywomans. °9 People magazine now places human interest stories
of normal folk right next to the photospreads of Oscar winners and rock
and roll stars.3 1° More and more of our celebrities appear on television or
online, no longer meant to look like larger than life gods and goddesses on
the big screen.311 Instead, today's celebrity personas are constructed
around conceptions of familiarity, rather than difference. 312 Talk shows,
although scripted, offer a less hierarchical presentation of the famous to the
public than in prior formats for celebrity publicity.313  The narrative of
reality shows focuses on what happens when ordinary people are placed in
the publicity machine. Big Brother participants, for example, are picked,
not for their unique qualities, but for their ability to represent everyone
else.314 Technology also had a role in deglamorizing celebrities as devices
for photographing and reproducing photographs ensured that the public
had easy access to candid images of the famous.315 Today, we routinely
see photographs of celebrities in the course of their daily activities without
makeup-and sometimes without clothing-that would not have been
available years ago. By portraying celebrities as regular people, the media
have made fame more egalitarian. Not everyone can be great, but
everyone has a chance to be a celebrity.316
At the same time, businesses became more and more enamored with
public figures who lacked any apparent qualification for their fame.
Modem marketing texts stress the value of "manufactured celebrities" over
stars with great talent because the former lack the bargaining power of the
latter and can be exploited to the full potential of media companies and
advertisers.31 7 As a result, advertisers have created their own celebrities,
like Jared for Subway and Steven the slacker for Dell Computers, that offer
no underlying talent or record of accomplishment to justify their
notoriety.318 Businesses quickly sign "accidental" celebrities like Kevin
Federline, Levi Johnston, Kato Kaelin, and Donna Rice to endorsement
309 See HERWrrZ, supra note 275, at 15 (discussing the understanding by film studios that there
needed to be a sense of unapproachability for movie stars of the studio era).
310 HALPERN, supra note 106, at 150-51.
31" GRAEME TURNER, ORDINARY PEOPLE AND THE MEDIA: THE DEMOTIC TURN 12 (2010).
312 HERWITZ, supra note 275, at 103.
313 MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 124-25.
3 14 TURNER, supra note 311, at 12-13.
315 See Brantley, supra note 275, at STI (describing the effects of constant celebrity visibility).
316 See TURNER, supra note 311, at 14 ("[T]hese trends have resulted in the idea of celebrity itself
mutating: no longer a magical condition, research suggests that it is fast becoming an almost reasonable
expectation for us to have of our everyday lives.").
317 See Egon Franck & Stephan Niuesch, Avoiding 'Star Wars '--Celebrity Creation as Media
Strategy, 60 KYKLOS 211, 227 (2007) (noting the dependence "manufactured celebrities" have on the
programs that made them visible).
318 Swerdlow & Swerdlow, supra note 98, at 14.
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deals the moment they hit the public consciousness.1 9 Paris Hilton has
been described as "the perfect post-modem celebrity" because there is no
awareness or expectation of talent to get in the way of her image. 320 Her
fame speaks entirely for itself and that fame has translated into great
commercial success.
32 1
Even the increasing popularity of the word "celebrity" demonstrates a
shift whereby fame became the reward not for achievement, but for
exposure. 322 Although modem use of the term began in the mid-i 800s,
32 3
"celebrity" began to be used with greater and greater frequency in the
media beginning in the 1960s.324  Before, the term "star" had been
favored. 325  "Star" suggests a connection to the individual's profession,
whether it be as an actor, an athlete, or something else. On the other hand,
"celebrity" represents the popularized version of the individual regardless
of her professional status. 26 Now it is commonplace to refer to modem
American life as a "celebrity culture.'327 In other words, much of our
culture now emphasizes being known as opposed to being great.
3. Democratizing the Law of Celebrity
The new democratic notion of fame found purchase in legislatures and
courts, and may provide one explanation for the expansion of celebrity
rights in the 1980s and 1990s, as described in Part II. Lawmakers in this
period trumpeted the democratic nature of celebrity, affirming that
everyone, not just celebrities, had the opportunity to become famous and
enjoy the particularized protection of the right of publicity.
Prior cases and commentaries suggested that the availability of the
319 Maureen Dowd, 'No Excuses' Jeans Pays Clinton Accuser $50,000, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1994, at Al2; Stuart Elliott, Colts and Bears and Kevin Federline, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2007, at C1;
Simpson Civil Case; Where Are They Now?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1997, at A16; Courtney Hazlett,
Nuts!.: Levi Johnston in Pistachio Ad, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 5, 2009, 10:20 PM), http://today.msnbc.
msn.com/id/33180490/ns/today-entertainment/t/talk-about-nuts-levi-johnston-pistachio-ad/.
320 Alan Behr & Andria Beeler-Norrholm, Fame, Fortune, and the Occasional Branding Misstep:
When Good Celebrities Go Bad, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Nov. 2006, at 6, 9.
321 See Goldberg v. Paris Hilton Entm't, Inc., No. 08-2261-CIV, 2009 WL 2525482, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 17, 2009) (stating that producers of a feature film paid Hilton one million dollars, not for her
acting prowess, but because they hoped to capitalize off of the "Paris Hilton brand").
322 Kwall, supra note 233, at 7; see also CASHMORE, supra note 4, at 7 ("A peculiarity of celebrity
culture is the shift of emphasis from achievement-based fame to media-driven renown.").
323 Kwall, supra note 233, at 7.
324 Id. at 8.
325 Jessica Evans, Introduction, in UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: INSIDE CELEBRITY, supra note 173,
at 1,4.
326 HERWITZ, supra note 275, at 16; Evans, supra note 173, at 1, 4.
327 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, From Victorian Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1407, 1420 (2009) (reviewing LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL
AND SOCIAL CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY (2007)) (noting the original
author's description of the rise of celebrity culture); Amy Henderson, Media and the Rise of Celebrity
Culture, MAG. HIST., Spring 1992, at 49.
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right of publicity was limited to a small group of people that had become
famous and managed to trade on that fame. Hence, the Georgia Supreme
Court explained that "while private citizens have the right of privacy,
public figures have a similar right of publicity .... 328 Another court
explained that only "celebrities" possessed a claim for violations of the
right.329 Some scholars of the time contended that non-celebrities had to
turn to the right of privacy-which did not provide any compensation for
the economic value of the defendant's unauthorized use-because they had
no right of publicity cause of action.33° Others insisted that there be some
proof that the plaintiff had been able to economically trade on her fame
before a right of publicity suit could be recognized.331 Either way, the
legal benefits of the right of publicity were limited to a select few.
Occasionally, judicial concern over the anti-democratic implications of
celebrity was made explicit. The Sixth Circuit offered a litany of reasons
for why the right of publicity should not survive a famous individual.332
What seemed most disconcerting to the court, however, was the prospect
of the economic power of celebrity remaining in particular bloodlines for
generations. 3  It explained that in the past, "the law has always thought
that leaving a good name to one's children is sufficient reward in itself for
the individual. 334 Placing the economic rewards of fame "in the hands of
heirs is contrary to our legal tradition and somehow seems contrary to the
moral presuppositions of our culture. 335 In 1979, the California Supreme
Court hinted at the same argument, opposing a legal regime where a
celebrity's heirs "are the only ones who should have the opportunity to
exploit their ancestor's personality.
3 36
In contrast, modem interpretation of the right of publicity stresses the
right's egalitarian nature. The position of "the vast majority of
328 Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d
697, 703 (Ga. 1982).
329 House v. Sports Films & Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d 684, 685 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
311 See Richard B. Hoffman, The Right of Publicity: An Update for Counseling Athletes and Other
Celebrities, MERCHANDISING REP., August 1983, at 9 ("A private citizen [has] only privacy, but not
publicity, actions available to him."); Berkman, supra note 39, at 532-33 ("[lit seems that a distinction
must be drawn between the commercial appropriation of a private individual's name or picture and a
similar appropriation from a public figure.").
331 Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by
the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1591 n.78, 1613-14 (1979).
332 See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959-60 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting
line-drawing problems, lack of precedent, and the fact that changing the law wouldn't increase
efficiency or productivity as arguments against recognizing the inheritability of the right of publicity).
333 See id. (discussing why the court had "serious reservations about making fame the permanent
right of a few individuals to the exclusion of the general public").334 Id. at 959.
335 Id.
336 Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 430 (Cal. 1979).
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commentators and courts is that everyone has a right of publicity.
3 37
Legislatures adopted the democratic view of celebrity, positing that
celebrity status is not only possible for everyone, but that the possibility
should be preserved and protected. Hence, Nevada's right of publicity
statute stresses that "[t]here is a right of publicity in the name, voice,
signature, photograph or likeness of every person., 338  Similarly, the
legislative history of Washington's right of publicity law reveals that
"[e]very individual residing in Washington has a property right in the use
of his or her name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in any
medium, in any manner., 339 Illinois' right of publicity law explains that
"[t]he right to control and to choose whether and how to use an
individual's identity for commercial purposes is recognized as each
individual's right of publicity.,
340
One might argue that by emphasizing the egalitarian nature of the
right, legislators were merely engaging in window dressing, trying to sell
their constituents on a new law really meant to protect a rarified few.
Simultaneous revisions in the judicial approach to the right of publicity
suggest, however, that the changing social definition of celebrity was also
responsible. Although judges are sensitive to public opinion, they have
less interest in rallying public opinion than legislators.341 Moreover, if
judges had been interested in winning popular approval for the right, they
should have talked up its democratic potential upon its arrival in the 1950s
and not waited until the end of the twentieth century. It was only in the
last years of the twentieth century that judges repeatedly took pains to note
the universal eligibility for the right of publicity. Even though most right
of publicity cases involve celebrity plaintiffs,342 modem courts emphasize
that the right, in principle, can apply to anyone. Hence, the California
Court of Appeals stressed that California's right of publicity statute needed
to be construed to include both celebrity and non-celebrity plaintiffs.343
One judge explained: "I am convinced that the right of publicity resides in
every person, not just famous and infamous individuals." 34  The Eleventh
Circuit took pains to alter its definition of the right of publicity, replacing a
1982 decision that defined it as "a celebrity's right" with a new definition
337 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 4:14.
338 NEv. REv. STAT. § 597.790 (2010).
3'9 H.B. 1074, 55th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998).
340 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/10 (West 2009).
341 Cf Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and
Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1061, 1063-64 (2010) (describing evidence that elected judges
reach results more in keeping with local public opinion than appointed judges do).
342 1 McCARTHY, supra note 22, § 4:14.
343 KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 2000).
344 Fanelle v. Lojack Corp., No. CIV. A. 99-4292, 2000 WL 1801270, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7,
2000).
describing it as an "individual's right." 345 Rather than requiring previous
commercial exploitation of one's identity, most courts have switched to a
presumption that sufficient economic value in the identity exists if it has
been commercially exploited by the defendant.346 Even the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition, adopted in 1995, notes that the "identity of
even an unknown person may possess commercial value," signaling that
even non-celebrities can enjoy the right.347
In reality, not everyone can take advantage of the right of publicity.348
It is frequently noted that the potential damages from infringement of the
right hinge on the plaintiffs fame, but fame is not a threshold requirement
for a suit. 349 Yet it seems unlikely that many rationally acting plaintiffs
would prosecute a lawsuit for which they could obtain little if anything in
damages. 350 Despite the assurances that the right applies to non-celebrities,
non-celebrity claims have been dismissed for lack of any proven value in
the plaintiffs identity.351 Lawmakers' constant affirmation that everyone
enjoys the right of publicity assures the public of the democratic nature of
fame. Most citizens seem to believe that fame is close at hand.35 2 In truth,
celebrity status, and the right of publicity, can be enjoyed only by a rare
few.
B. Celebrity and Interest Group Politics
"[T]he history of lobbying comes close to being the history of
American legislation., 35 3 As described above, a number of states enacted
new, broad right of publicity laws in the 1980s and 1990s. This Article
345 Toffoloni v. LFP Publ'g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11 th Cir. 2009) (quoting Martin
Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga.
1982)); see also Cheatham v. Paisano Publ'ns, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 386 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (noting, in
the first case to address the issue, that "celebrity status" is not a prerequisite for such a claim under
Kentucky's common law right of publicity); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d
254, 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) ("[A)ll persons, of whatever station in life, from the relatively unknown
to the world famous, are to be secured against rapacious commercial exploitation.").
346 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 4:17; see, e.g., Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 693 N.E.2d
510, 514-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that plaintiff may recover damages where defendant received
commercial benefit from unauthorized use of plaintiffs image).
347 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995); see also id § 49 cmt. d
("[N]on-celebrities may recover the commercial value of the defendant's use.").
348 See K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, the Bad, and the Right of
Publicity, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 521, 536-38 (2008) (describing the difficulties non-celebrities face in
attempting to establish a right of publicity cause of action).
349 See KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 2000).
350 See Greene, supra note 348, at 538.
351 E.g., Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Cox
v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 564 (Utah 1988).
352 See HALPERN, supra note 106, at 196 (recounting 2005 study where thirty-one percent of
American teenagers believed that they would be famous someday).
353 EDGAR LANE, LOBBYING AND THE LAW 18 (1964).
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suggests that lawmakers were motivated by new perspectives on celebrity,
recognizing democratic potential and economic rationality where once they
saw elitism and the dangers of mob psychology. Yet legislators were
influenced not only by these new perspectives on celebrity, but also by a
furious lobbying campaign conducted by the famous, their heirs, and the
licensing companies that stood to gain the most from expanding celebrity
rights. These groups took advantage of the social and technological
changes described earlier to pass sweeping celebrity rights bills through
statehouses across the country. The remainder of this Section describes the
interest groups that formed a successful political coalition for broadened
publicity rights at the end of the century. A variety of stakeholders are
interested in regulation of commercial use of celebrity personas. On one
side are those parties that desire plenary protection against all unauthorized
uses of celebrity. On the other side are those who oppose celebrity
publicity rights because they have their own interest in exploiting celebrity
personas without restriction. In the middle are the media companies that
have reasons to both support and to reject expansion of the right of
publicity.
1. Celebrities and Other Assigned Rights Holders
Celebrities and their heirs are naturally interested in broader publicity
rights. The historical record certainly suggests that celebrity lobbying had
an effect on the legislators considering these rights in the 1980s and
1990S. 354 It was no accident that the states that passed particularly strong
right of publicity laws also served as the domiciles for entertainers with
obvious postmortem commercial value. Hence, the laws enacted in
Indiana, Tennessee, and Washington benefitted the estates of James Dean,
Elvis Presley, and Jimi Hendrix. Texas's postmortem statute was dubbed
the "Buddy Holly Bill" because of the testimony of his widow on behalf of
the legislation.355 In California, the heirs of John Wayne, Groucho Marx,
and Marilyn Monroe have all been involved in various legislative
enhancements of that state's right of publicity.356  In an analysis of the
354 See Kathy Heller, Deciding Who Cashes in on the Deceased Celebrity Business, 11 CHAP. L.
REv. 545, 549-50 (2008) (crediting celebrities and their heirs with prompting the passage of a
descendible right of publicity in California); Mark G. Tratos & Stephen Weizenecker, Dead Celebrity
Wars, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Summer 2007, at 16 (stating that implementation of California's
postmortem statute "was in no small part because of the efforts of the Marilyn Monroe estate").
355 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 6:120.
356 Joseph J. Beard, Fresh Flowers for Forest Lawn: Amendment of the California Post-Mortem
Right of Publicity Statute, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter 2000, at 23; Stephen F. Rohde, Dracula: Still
Undead, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1985, at 51, 52-53; Tratos & Weizenecker, supra note 354, at 16; see also
Thomas F. Zuber, Everlasting Fame: Recent Legislation Has Clarified the Descendible Right of
Publicity for Personalities Who Died Prior to 1985, L.A. LAW., May 2009, at 30-31 (describing the
central role of Fred Astaire's widow in producing the legislation that expanded California's right of
publicity protections in 1999).
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1985 law that first enacted protections for deceased personalities' publicity
rights, the California Senate Judiciary Committee contended that testimony
from "the son of W.C. Fields, Priscilla Presley, and Burt Lancaster
apparently convinced the [Senate Judiciary] committee and the Legislature
that increasing protections for those rights ... were called for." '357 A 1999
revision of that law, which further strengthened publicity rights in that
state, was deemed the Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act because it
had been championed by Robyn Astaire, Fred Astaire's widow.358 Also, in
California, the Screen Actors Guild, a union representing celebrities and
celebrity hopefuls, was critical in persuading the legislature to enact the
1985 postmortem statute35 9 as well as another law in 2007 that vests that
right retroactively for celebrities who had already died before the 1985 law
took effect.
360
Licensing firms benefit from rights of longer duration and legal
mechanisms for shutting down unlicensed competitors, making them
natural supporters of enhanced publicity rights. In the 1980s, firms that
specialized in the licensing of celebrity personas began to appear. The
Roger Richman Agency, which represented the heirs of Albert Einstein,
Sigmund Freud, Clark Gable, and Mae West, pressed for legislative
change.36' This period also witnessed the emergence of CMG Worldwide,
a firm representing the commercial interests of the estates of deceased
celebrities such as Babe Ruth, Jackie Robinson, and Humphrey Bogart as
362well as living clients such as Lauren Bacall and Sophia Loren. Firms
like CMG and the Richman Agency lobbied for postmortem protections
that could provide a potential revenue stream that was large enough and
stable enough to trigger serious investment and rights management.
363
These firms were instrumental in pushing forward expansion of celebrity
357 S. Judiciary Comm. Bill Analysis, S.B. 771, 2007-08 Reg. Sess., at 5 (Cal. 2007).
358 1MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 6:25.
359 Rohde, supra note 356, at 52-53.
360 Postmortem Publicity Rights of Deceased Celebrities: Hearing on S.B. 771 Before the S. Rules
Comm., 2007-08 Reg. Sess. 4 (Cal. 2007).
361 Dennis Hevesi, Afterlife of the Famous: Heirs Warn of 'Poachers,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1988,
at B1I.362 CMG Worldwide: Representing the Greatest Icons, http://www.cmgworldwide.com/corporate/
history.html (detailing the history of CMG); see also Leah Hoffman, Agents of the Dead, FORBES.COM
(Oct. 31, 2005, 3:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2005/10/31/dead-celebrities-agents cx lh 1031
deadagents-deadceleb05.html (discussing the introduction of boutique management to promote the
rights of deceased celebrities).
363 See Heller, supra note 354, at 545 (describing the licensing of postmortem rights as "one of the
most valuable sources of income for a celebrity's estate"); Terrell & Smith, supra note 92, at 22
("Investors (including the artist himself) would willingly pay more now for a right to exploit that will
last far into the future than for a right that will disappear or diminish significantly at the artist's
death.").
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rights in the 1980s and 1990s. 364  The Indiana right of publicity statute,
passed in 1994 and described as the most expansive publicity right in the
nation, was drafted by the head of CMG Worldwide, which is based in
Indianapolis.365 One account discussing the most recent amendment to
California's right of publicity describes it as "rushed through the
legislature at the behest of a greedy licensee .... When CMG was a
litigant in a high-profile case involving the estate of Marilyn Monroe and
received an adverse decision from a federal court, it immediately reacted
by hiring lobbyists to push a remedial bill through the California
legislature.367 In just a few weeks, the legislature passed new legislation to
abrogate the decision and benefit CMG. By the end of the 1990s, thanks in
part to the recognition of postmortem rights by numerous courts and state
legislatures, licensing firms were generating millions of dollars in licensing
fees from deceased celebrities, 368  a third of which they pocketed
themselves.369
2. Rival Copyright Interests
On the other side of the ledger are those who resist any expansion of
the right of publicity. One interest group opposing the right of publicity is
made up of those who hold contrasting intellectual property rights
potentially conflicting with celebrity rights. For example, photographers
enjoy copyright protection for their photographs of deceased celebrities.370
A new property right that vests in the celebrity herself (or the celebrity's
heirs) threatens this benefit as a photographer licensing her celebrity
photos may have to seek permission from the subject of that photograph or
364 See Michael Decker, Note, Goodbye, Norma Jean: Marilyn Monroe and the Right of
Publicity's Transformation at Death, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 271 (2009) ("[I]t is licensing
companies that are at the heart of the battle over the postmortem right of publicity.").
365 See Decker, supra note 364, at 246 (noting that the Indiana right of publicity statute was
propelled by Mark Roesler, CMG's Chief Executive Officer); Nancy Hass, "I Seek Dead People, "
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, at 38 ("Roesler [CMG CEO] ... virtually created the 'right to publicity' for
the heirs of deceased stars.").
366 Zuber, supra note 356, at 29. The amendment was drafted and sponsored by the Screen Actors
Guild, but at the behest of CMG Worldwide. Id. at 31 n.49.
367 Gary Scott, Protecting the Future ofMarilyn's Past, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 8, 2007, at 1, 4.
368 Greg Johnson, Protecting Dead Icons Back for an Encore: Monroe, Bogart and Others Now
Star in Commercials, Raising Thorny Legal and Financial Issues, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1999, at C6; see
also Decker, supra note 364, at 246 ("[CMG] reaps between $12 and $20 million in annual revenue by
representing Monroe, Babe Ruth, James Dean, and more than 250 other deceased celebrities.").
369 Hass, supra note 365, at 38. The value of celebrity postmortem rights continues to grow.
Michael Jackson's estate grossed more than one billion dollars in the year after his death, including
millions of dollars in licenses for celebrity merchandise. Jim Farber, Wanna Be Selling Something: A
Year After His Death, Michael Jackson Is the Ka-ching of Pop, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 22, 2010 at 24;
Michael Jackson Has "Made $1bn" Since His Death, BBC NEWS (June 22, 2010, 5:23 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10373358.
370 Tratos & Weizenecker, supra note 354, at 18.
2011] A RIGHT IS BORN
CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW
risk a suit for infringement. Indeed, photographers have strongly opposed
various legislative proposals to enhance publicity rights.37' Other groups
potentially opposed to celebrity rights are the publishing and advertising
industries.372
It appears that for most states that have considered right of publicity
legislation, the support of celebrities, licensing companies, and (as
discussed later) movie and television studios has trumped opposition from
photographers and others. Since the 1980s, when either courts or
legislatures have considered the right of publicity, they have generally
acted to expand the right, thereby enlarging celebrity economic power.1
71
3. Studio Influence
Another key interest group with a stake in this battle is the
entertainment media, particularly movie and television studios. These
entities have reasons to be somewhat ambivalent about celebrity rights. On
the one hand, they may view an expanding right of publicity negatively.
Efforts to generate new content could be jeopardized by vigorous publicity
371 See Heller, supra note 354, at 560 (describing photographers' opposition to California's 1985
postmortem rights bill); Senate Judiciary Comm. Bill Analysis, S.B. 771, 2007-08 Reg. Sess., at 5 (Cal.
2007) (describing letters of opposition from photographers, which claimed that proposed extension of
publicity rights would "cause substantial damage to 'any business that is based on photographs or
reproductions of famous people"'). One legal objection to state rights of publicity offered by
photographers and other copyright holders is that such rights are preempted by federal copyright law.
When a direct conflict exists between federal law and state law, the state law must yield. U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 1. A strong argument can be made that it is not permissible for a photographer's (or other
copyright holder's) federal copyright in a celebrity image to be reduced in value by a state's decision to
grant a competing publicity right to the celebrity herself. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright
Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 199, 216 (2002) ("The right to display a
work is severely limited by performers' publicity rights if such rights are never preempted by copyright
law."). In general, however, most courts that have considered the question have determined that the
subject matter of the right of publicity lies sufficiently outside of the scope of copyright such that there
is no preemption. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 11:50.
372 See, e.g., Governor Joins Lawmakers on the Easy Road, ARIz. DAILY STAR, June 3, 2007, at
A9 (showing the effect of right of publicity statutes on advertisers and free speech); Hevesi, supra note
361, at B1 (noting that magazine publishers were opposed to the New York State Celebrity Rights Act
that included a right of publicity section).
373 The lone exceptions have been Wisconsin and New York. The federal district court in
Wisconsin has held that Wisconsin's common law right of publicity is limited to living persons. See
Hagen v. Dahmer, No. 94-C-0485, 1995 WL 822644, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 13, 1995). New York
courts have refused to recognize any common law right of publicity, forcing any publicity rights claims
to be addressed under the terms of a 1903 statute for invasion of privacy. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 22,
§ 6:74. Yet proposals for reforming New York law to bring it in line with the rest of the country have
consistently been defeated. In 1988, hearings were held on a postmortem right, but the legislation
failed. Decker, supra note 364, at 254. Other right of publicity bills proposed in 1989, 1990, 1991,
1993, and 1995 also failed to win support. In 2007, when a federal court in New York determined that
the company holding the publicity rights to Marilyn Monroe's persona had no cause of action under
New York law, again the legislature studied the issue of postmortem rights. Decker, supra note 364, at
244. Yet the proposed legislation, largely identical to legislation that passed in just a few weeks in
California, failed to emerge from committee. Legislation proposed in 2008 met a similar fate.
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rights or at least subjected to a significant payout to celebrities and
celebrity heirs. For example, a studio wishing to develop a biopic of a
famous, deceased musician might have to gain clearance from the
musician's estate before going forward with its film. Because of these
fears, in California, the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA"),
as well as television networks CBS and NBC, opposed the initial granting
of postmortem rights in 1985. The studios have made similar arguments
in opposing proposed legislation to create a postmortem right in New
York.3
75
On the other hand, these content providers also have a countervailing
interest in strong publicity rights. As discussed earlier, modern media
conglomerates need celebrities to promote their content over multiple
platforms.376 Strong publicity rights help provide consistent control over
celebrity images, thereby making this important component of modem
media more stable and reliable. By limiting the number of ways to legally
use a celebrity's persona, publicity rights inoculate that persona from the
potentially dilutive effects of multiple speakers sending inconsistent
messages about that celebrity. Movie and television studios provide the
stages for the population to experience celebrity. These businesses want to
preserve their own ability to use celebrity to attract viewers while at the
same time making sure that these celebrities are not subject to radical
reappropriations by others. Although the studios might prefer a return to
the past when they controlled celebrity publicity, a strong right of publicity
vested in the individual celebrity at least helps promote a consistent, and
hopefully not oversaturated, image for their stars.
In large part, the story of the expanding right of publicity is a story of
celebrity rights proponents incorporating the studios into their legislative
proposals. The political clout wielded by the Hollywood studios has been
documented in other contexts.377 The industry's support became a critical
factor in determining whether or not celebrity rights legislation would be
passed. Although the motion picture studios originally opposed
postmortem rights in California, they were able to secure significant
changes in the proposed legislation that favored their own interests and
tempered their opposition. Hence, the 1985 legislation was altered to
exclude use of persona in "a play, book, magazine, musical composition,
374 Heller, supra note 354, at 550.
375 See Zuber, supra note 356, at 31 (discussing the opposition to proposed New York legislation
by groups such as the American Society of Magazine Photographers); see also infra note 389 and
accompanying text.
376 See supra Section ILA.
377 See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23 (2001) (describing Disney's successful
lobbying effort to extend copyright protection for its Mickey Mouse character for an additional twenty
years).
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film, radio or television program other than an advertisement., 378 Texas's
postmortem publicity right was drafted in consultation with the motion
picture industry and, in the floor debate over the legislation, its sponsor
urged its passage without any amendments, lest the industry withdraw its
support.379 One assemblyman objected to the legislation and to the movie
studios' intimate role in its drafting, stating "I'm sure the motion picture
industry signed off on it because they were specifically exempted so it
doesn't apply to them. 38° Indeed, during discussions over the Texas bill,
revisions were made to insure that uses of deceased celebrity names,
likenesses, and voices could be made in films and television programs
without violating the new law.381
More recent alterations to the California right of publicity have also
won the studios' approval. In 1999, when the California legislature
decided to grant celebrity heirs an additional twenty years of protection,
extending control of postmortem publicity rights from fifty years beyond
the date of death to seventy years beyond the date of death and eliminating
several prior specific statutory exemptions, the television networks and
motion picture studios agreed to the expansion. 2 A proposed provision
within that legislation that would have prohibited, in expressive works,
manipulation of deceased personas through digital technology was dropped
at the behest of the MPAA. 383  Similarly, the studios managed to kill
another provision that would have outlawed defamatory references to
deceased celebrities in films and television shows. As one of the chief
lobbyists for the MPAA explained after the passage of California's 1999
law, "new language" was added during the drafting process that "resolved
our objections., 384 Most recently, the California legislature responded to a
district court opinion holding that the estate of Marilyn Monroe had no
publicity rights because a statutory descendible publicity right did not exist
when she died in 1962.385 Just a few weeks after this opinion issued, the
legislature expanded celebrity postmortem rights by providing that such
rights cover not just those celebrities who died when the original
postmortem right was enacted in 1985, but also celebrities who died before
1985.386 The studios made no opposition to this legislation.387
378 CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(n) (West 1992).379 See Audio tape: Texas House of Representatives, Floor Debate (Apr. 9, 1987) (on file with
author).
311 See id
31 H. Judicial Affairs Comm. Bill Analysis, H.B. 834, 1986-87 Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1987).
382 Heller, supra note 354, at 554-55; Zuber, supra note 356, at 30-31.
383 Beard, supra note 356, at 25.
394 Id.
385 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1157-58
(C.D. Cal. 2008).
386 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 6:25.
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In contrast, when the studios are not brought into the legislative
process, proposed right of publicity laws die in committee. For example,
in 2007, the New York legislature began consideration of a postmortem
publicity right.388 The exclusion of the media from involvement with the
proposed legislation may well be one of the reasons it failed. In letters of
opposition to the proposed legislation, several studios expressed their
displeasure at not being included in the drafting process.3 89  Given the
political economy of celebrity rights, such proposals are much less likely to
secure the necessary legislative support when studio concerns are ignored.
4. Individual Consumers
Individual consumers have an interest in this debate as well. In
modern life, where most encounters are with strangers and individuals
believe they have the ability to shape their own identities, celebrities serve
as powerful cultural symbols. A decision to invoke a celebrity like Martha
Stewart instantly communicates something about a person, something very
different from the choice to invoke a celebrity like Ozzy Ozborne.
Publicity rights threaten this process of identity formation and personal
expression by giving the celebrity, or her estate, the power to determine
which invocations of the celebrity persona are appropriate and which are
not.
390
387 Cal. Bill Analysis, SB 771, Assemb. Judiciary Comm., 2007-08 Reg. Sess. (Jul. 10, 2007)
(listing those in support and opposition to the legislation); Cal. Bill Analysis, SB 771, S. Judiciary
Comm., 2007-08 Reg. Sess. (Sept. 6, 2007) (same).
388 State Assemb., A. 08836, 2007-08 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
389 See, e.g., Letter from Stacey Bymes, Senior Vice President & Intellectual Property Counsel,
NBC Universal to The Honorable Helene Weinstein, New York State Assembly (June 20, 2007) (on
file with author) (explaining that NBC was crafting its own bill that it had not yet had the opportunity
to put before the legislature); Letter from Henry S. Hoberrman, Senior Vice President & Counsel,
ABC, Inc. to The Honorable Helene Weinstein, New York State Assembly (June 19, 2007) (on file
with author) ("We urge you to delay further action on the Bill in order to afford interested parties,
including Disney, ESPN and ABC, the opportunity to present our views and discuss them with you and
other legislators in a meaningful way."); Letter from Louise S. Sams, Executive Vice President &
General Counsel, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. to The Honorable Helene Weinstein, New York
State Assembly (June 18, 2008) (on file with author) (contending that the legislature "should not enact
such a troubling statute without serious debate and consideration by all affected").
39 This view of celebrity as a valuable tool for personal expression and identity formation only
came to be appreciated in recent years. Before the 1980s, celebrity discourse was believed to be a one-
way street as audiences accepted the messages encoded in celebrity texts. Intellectuals of the time, like
the theorists of the Frankfurt School, viewed celebrity as a part of a larger mechanism for oppression.
Horkheimer & Adomo, supra note 176, at 100-01; see also STURKEN & CARTWRIGHT, supra note 175,
at 164-68 (describing influence of Frankfurt School theorists' critique of mass media). Herbert
Marcuse expanded on this line of thought, contending that the celebrities promoted by the
entertainment industry were agents of manipulation and indoctrination that lull individuals into
acceptance of an iniquitous social system. MARSHALL, supra note 155, at 10 (discussing HERBERT
MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964)). Meanwhile, celebrity publicity in this period tried to
evoke authenticity, i.e., a view of the real person behind the actor on screen. Fan magazines offered
glimpses into the stars' private lives, supposedly getting behind the public fagade to the real person.
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In the 1980s and 1990s, postmodern sensibilities reshaped academic
understandings of the semiotics of celebrity. Prior scholars of celebrity
were criticized for portraying audiences as unrealistically passive.39' New
academic disciplines emerged to emphasize the unexpected ways in which
audiences interacted with celebrity symbols. Media scholar John Fiske
argued that consumers appropriated celebrities for their own ends.3 92
Audiences developed their own texts by borrowing from and reworking the
proffered meanings in celebrity products.393  According to Fiske,
"[p]opular culture is made by the people, not imposed on them; it stems
from within, from below, not from above. Popular culture is the art of
making do with what the system provides. 394  Others followed suit,
maintaining that power was really located not with the producers of
culture, but in the consumptive practices of those receiving cultural
material.395 Meanwhile, artists like Andy Warhol revealed that new
technologies had usurped some of the cultural authority of celebrities and
their handlers as the capacity to reproduce celebrity images also allowed
for their meaning to be re-inscribed by different owners.396 Furthermore,
celebrity publicity itself changed, openly acknowledging that its images
were inauthentic and inviting audiences to participate in the construction of
celebrity narratives.397
This new vision of dynamic exchange between celebrities and their
audiences could be seen as providing a compelling rationale against the
expansion of celebrity rights. Laws that prevented derivative use of
celebrity messages threatened to take away valuable raw material for the
construction of social identity. Some legal scholars have seized on the
GAMSON, supra note 75, at 16. Whether one listened to the academic critics or the stars' publicists, the
missives coming from celebrities were not subject to reinterpretation by others. Audiences in this
period were viewed as inert receptors of celebrity messages.
391 Stevenson, supra note 173, at 135, 137; see also Madow, supra note 2, at 192 ("[T]he image-
formation process resists centralized capture or control more than celebrities would like.").39 2 JOHN FISKE, UNDERSTANDING POPULAR CULTURE (1989).
393 Stevenson, supra note 173, at 135, 155.
394 FISKE, supra note 392, at 25.
395 E.g., RICHARD DYER, HEAVENLY BODIES: FILM STARS AND SOCIETY 14 (2d ed. 2004) (noting
the role the public plays in cultivating celebrity image); Stuart Hall, Encoding/decoding, in CULTURE,
MEDIA, LANGUAGE 128, 128-38 (Stuart Hall et al. eds., 1980).
396 STJRKEN & CARTWRIGHT, supra note 175, at 39. Many cultural studies scholars continue to
adopt the same view of the ability of citizens to rework media messages when discussing online
entertainment. See TURNER, supra note 311, at 4 (discussing the increasing influence of audiences as
they participate more in the media through formats such as reality television and Web 2.0).
397 See GAMSON, supra note 75, at 17 ("Armed with knowledge about the process, the audience
doesn't need to believe or disbelieve the hype, just enjoy it."); see also TURNER, supra note 112, at 55
(theorizing that Madonna's fans are aware of the "cynicism" behind the production of her celebrity
image); GARY WHANNEL, MEDIA SPORT STARS: MASCULINITIES AND MORALITIES 201 (2002)
("[F]ootball fans, music lovers and other enthusiasts live out an intense and pleasurable relation to the
object of their passion, and also, at the same time, recognize it as commodified, transformed and out of
their reach.").
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work of academics like Fiske to argue for fewer restrictions on secondary
use of celebrity images.3 9  Appealing to the need for "semiotic
democracy," a term coined by Fiske to describe viewers' ability to attach
different meanings to televised images other than those assigned by
broadcasters,399 these scholars argue for reduced publicity rights to allow
400the dynamic between celebrity and audience to continue.
Despite the appeals of these scholars, "semiotic democracy" has had a
narrow effect on the right of publicity. The voices of individual consumers
of celebrity are unlikely to be heard when it comes to crafting legislation.
It is difficult for citizens concerned about personal expression to coalesce
in a way that would make their presence felt in Sacramento, Indianapolis,
Nashville, or Albany. "Collective action problems are especially intense in
the context of IP policymaking, and they distort policy in favor of producer
interests."40' Instead, other interest groups need to represent these
individual citizens if the advocacy of celebrities, licensing firms, and the
motion picture industry is to be counteracted. Some groups do attempt to
represent individuals that want to use celebrities as a means of personal
expression. The American Civil Liberties Union opposed California's
initial decision to grant postmortem rights.40 2 In general, however, the
lobbying efforts of those favoring expanding publicity rights have
triumphed.
Moreover, "semiotic democracy" has had little effect on judicial
construction of the right of publicity. Some judges attempting to resolve
publicity claims do mention the use of celebrities as symbols reflecting
individual and group values.40 3 One decision even references media
398 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1119, 1142 (2007) ("The meaning of a cultural artifact is not inherent in the work itself, but arises
from the way it is represented through our language and practices."); Laura A. Heymann, The Public's
Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 698
(2009) (discussing the "denotation" and "connotation" system of signification, which emphasizes the
receiver's role in establishing significance of a particular message); Madow, supra note 2, at 143-44
(discussing Fiske's belief that an individual's consumption of celebrity merchandise is a choice that
furthers a specific cultural message about the celebrity).
3" Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New
Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 1237, 1279 n.129 (2005); Mary S.W. Wong, Transformative User-
Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 1075, 1077 n.2 (2009).
400 E.g., Madow, supra note 2, at 134; David Tan, Beyond Trademark Law: What the Right of
Publicity Can Learn from Cultural Studies, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 913, 988 (2008).
401 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1201,
1222 (2009).
402 Heller, supra note 354, at 550.
403 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937-38 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 1996); Comedy III Prods.,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001).
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studies texts. 4°4 Perhaps relatedly, some recent opinions of the California
Supreme Court set forth robust visions of how the right of free expression
should be balanced against the right of publicity.45 According to that
court, celebrity images that are so "transformed" by the defendant that they
become "primarily the defendant's own expression rather than the
celebrity's likeness" are inmmune to right of publicity infringement
claims.40 6 Hence, when the defendant adds its own "significant expressive
content," the First Amendment trumps the right of publicity.4 7 Such a
balancing test is appropriate, the court explained, because "celebrities take
on personal meanings to many individuals in the society [and] the creative
appropriation of celebrity images can be an important avenue of individual
expression. ' '4 s
Yet considerations of semiotic democracy have had a relatively small
impact on the contours of the right. In general, the cases involving the
right that typically made their way through the courts and impressed
themselves on the minds of judges and legislators did not appear to involve
subcultures appropriating famous personas to make a political statement.
Rather they appeared to be blatant attempts to use celebrities on mugs or t-
shirts .4 9 To lawmakers, those types of activities needed to be shut down
so that nascent celebrities would have the incentive to create. Moreover, as
Mark McKenna has pointed out, and judges likely believe as well,
individual responses to celebrity images typically do not involve
merchandising and, therefore, do not fall within the right's ambit.
410
Citizens are free to do whatever they want with a celebrity's persona
within the privacy of their own home. As a result, it was improbable that
the right of publicity could do anything to affect these private attempts to
make meaning from celebrity messages.4a ' Other courts have rejected
California's "transformation" test, maintaining that it goes too far in
allowing others to free ride on someone else's celebrity and paying less
attention to the need for individuals to obtain products that rework
44 See Cardloons, 95 F.3d at 972 (citing JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN
CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN THE ERA OF MASS COMMUNICATION 163 (1990)).
405 For a discussion of how the jurisprudential balance between property rights and free
expression differs in the separate regimes of right of publicity, copyright, and trademarks, see Mark
Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1943210.
416 Comedy Il Prods., 21 P.3d at 809.
407 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003).
408 Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 803.
4 See, e.g., Audio tape: Texas House of Representatives, Floor Debate (Apr. 9, 1987) (on file
with author) (recording the sponsor of Texas's postmortem rights bill providing examples of "crass
commercialism," such as pictures on t-shirts and coffee mugs).
410 McKenna, supra note 301, at 293.
4" Id at 231 n.23.
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celebrity messages.
In addition, to the extent judges have recognized the importance of
celebrity to individual expression, their responses have been
compartmentalized within analysis of First Amendment defenses to right
of publicity claims. In other words, whatever contribution the concept of
semiotic democracy has made to the scope of the right of publicity, it has
not altered the elements of the right of publicity cause of action. As two
early critics of right of publicity doctrine stated, "the First Amendment
must be brought in by the court as an external limitation on rights that have
been defined in isolation from it . . . produc[ing] uncertainties and
distortions in what should be a logical coherent structure. ' 4"3 Reliance on
an uncertain First Amendment defense to safeguard celebrity's role as a
tool for individual development likely produces a chilling effect.
414
Celebrities with superior legal resources can sue start-up businesses that
may not want to proceed to a trial if they are forced to rely on a hazy
defense based on free expression.415  In sum, although individual
consumers have reasons not to support expansive publicity rights, their
voices did not register with the legislators and judges weighing the costs
and benefits of celebrity protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
It took decades for the right of publicity to become the valuable
economic property interest that it is today. The right first appeared in
1953, but it only became descendible, broad enough in scope to cover all
aspects of persona, and free from its privacy right limitations at the end of
the twentieth century. Although the commercial importance of celebrity
increased during this period, that is not the whole story. For most of the
century, judges and lawmakers expressed reservations over the
psychological effects of fame on the famous and their audiences. They
also worried over the democratic implications of celebrity. It was only
when their perceptions of celebrity became rationalized and democratized
in the 1980s and 1990s that they permitted doctrinal innovations greatly
412 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373-74 (Mo. 2003).
413 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 331, at 1579.
414 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 580-81 (1977) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (maintaining that the ambiguous nature of the majority's articulation of a First Amendment
defense for news reporting would lead to "media self-censorship").
415 Cf William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 52 (2008)
(contending that the uncertainty surrounding doctrinal safeguards for free expression in trademark law
"creates a classic chilling effect upon the unlicensed use of trademarks to facilitate speech, even when
such uses are perfectly lawful"); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark
Law, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 381, 453 (2008) (maintaining that explicit First Amendment analysis in
trademark cases can potentially be counterproductive if such analysis cannot be performed at the
motion to dismiss stage and litigation costs force defendants to settle rather than litigate).
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strengthening the rights of celebrities.
Although this Article investigates the social history surrounding a
single property right, it may offer a potential description of the conditions
needed for new property rights to flourish. If the same cultural and
political forces that propelled the right's expansion manifested during the
emergence of other property rights, this experience offers persuasive
evidence of the environmental conditions needed for such rights to
develop. One should be cautious in reading too much into the history of a
particular property right. The development of the right of publicity may be
unique. But maybe not. Research in a different aspect of intellectual
property-trademarks-reveals that courts only agreed to abandon strict
doctrinal limitations on the rights of mark holders after concerns over the
cultural effects of advertising were assuaged.416 As with the right of
publicity, judges investigated the psychological and democratic impact of
robust trademark rights before deciding to change the legal terrain.
Comparisons of the cultural circumstances surrounding the genesis of other
property rights would be helpful. Future research could track the discourse
surrounding other new subjects for "propertization" to determine if the
same social understandings were present when courts and legislatures
decided to provide legal recognition. The history of the right of publicity
suggests that when judges and legislators elect to grant property rights,
they have more in mind than "if value, then right.' 417
416 See Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trademark Law, 38 N.M. L.
REv. 1, 12 (2008) ("Advertising's importance to the national economy, its embrace by a critical mass
of cultural observers, and the professionalization of the advertising field all led to greater judicial
safeguards against brand-name 'free-riding."').
417 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1172-73.
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